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Abstract:	  Evergreening	  of	  patents	  is	  common	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  sector.	  Lately,	  it	  has	  become	  increasingly	  
difficult	  for	  originator	  companies	  to	  know	  how	  far	  they	  can	  go	  when	  using	  their	  patent	  rights	  without	  abusing	  
their	  dominant	  position.	  This	  thesis	  makes	  an	  attempt	  to	  provide	  guidance	  for	  these	  companies.	  Evergreening	  
is	   presented	   by	   giving	   the	   reader	   a	   theoretical	   background	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   essential	   components	   of	  
evergreening,	  namely	  the	  pharmaceutical	  sector,	  patent	  law	  and	  competition	  law.	  This	  outline	  will	  be	  used	  as	  
a	  base	   to	  analyse	  under	  what,	   if	  any,	   circumstances	  evergreening	  constitutes	  an	   infringement	  of	  Article	  102	  
TFEU.	  The	   result	  of	   this	   study	   indicates	   that	  evergreening	   can	   lead	   to	  a	   foreclosure	  on	   the	  market	  and	   that	  
such	   conduct	   will	   be	   liable	   under	   Article	   102	   depending	   on	   the	   circumstances	   in	   the	   specific	   case.	   As	   a	  
concluding	  remark,	  the	  author	  gives	  her	  view	  on	  why	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  engage	  in	  evergreening	  and	  
suggests	  that	  a	  reform	  of	  the	  patent	  system	  may	  be	  a	  way	  forward.	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Summary 
This thesis identifies some of the uncertainties surrounding the application 
of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) to evergreening of pharmaceutical patens. The concept of ever-
greening refers to a multitude of strategies adopted by patent holders with 
the aim to extend the privileged position that the patentee holds due to this 
exclusive right. Evergreening is common in the pharmaceutical sector, 
considering the financial profits that a successful patented drug can 
generate. Recently, the pharmaceutical industry has undergone some 
significant changes with several lucrative blockbuster medicines having lost 
patent protection. Even though an increased amount of money is spent on 
research and development (R&D), the companies seem to have difficulties 
to launch new medicines. As a consequence, they become increasingly 
dependent on their existing patents and do their utmost to maximize profits 
from them. This may lead to evergreening.  
 
The purpose with this thesis is to investigate the legality of evergreening by 
describing and analysing such behaviour in relation to Article 102. This 
thesis primarily put focus on one of these strategies: the launch of a second 
generation medicine. By launching a newly patented version of a product 
which is close to patent expiry, the risk of generic companies gaining a 
significant market share is decreased while the originator company 
maintains comparable sales numbers and avoids a decline in price. 
Depending on the measures taken around the launch of a second generation 
product, a pharmaceutical company may be liable under Article 102.  
 
Evergreening involves three fields of regulation: pharmaceutical regulatory 
law, patent law and competition law which may seem difficult to reconcile 
since they pursuit different policy objectives. For example, the intersection 
between intellectual property law and competition law has been the subject 
of intense debate and when applied to the context of pharmaceutical patents, 
it becomes even more complex. In this thesis, it will be demonstrated that 
they may just be different means to the same goal. Nonetheless, it is shown 
that the relationship is complicated and that the application of competition 
rules to evergreening can lead to difficulties.  
 
To decide how far a patent holder can go when it comes to evergreening, 
this thesis takes its stance in the recently decided AstraZeneca: the first case 
in which a pharmaceutical company was fined for an abuse of its dominant 
position in relation to evergreening in the EU. The result of this study 
indicates that evergreening may, depending on the circumstances in the 
specific case, constitute a violation of Article 102. The concluding chapter 
elaborates on the reasons to why pharmaceutical companies engage in 
evergreening and suggests that a reform of the patent system may be a way 
forward.  
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats behandlar några av de frågetecken som uppkommer vid 
tillämpningen av artikel 102 i Fördraget om Europeiska unionens 
funktionssätt i förhållande till evergreening av läkemedelspatent. Begreppet 
evergreening syftar till ett flertal olika patentstrategier som har för avsikt att 
förlänga den privilegierade position som en patenthavare åtnjuter när hans 
eller hennes produkt skyddas av ensamrätt. Med tanke på de vinster som ett 
framgångsrikt patenterat läkemedel kan ge generera är det inte konstigt att 
evergreening är vanligt inom läkemedelsbranschen.  På senare tid har 
läkemedelsbranschen genomgått stora förändringar då flera lukrativa 
storsäljande läkemedel har förlorat patentskydd. Även om företagen 
investerar pengar på forskning och utveckling verkar de ha svårt att lansera 
nya läkemedel. Till följd av detta blir företagen allt mer beroende av sina 
befintliga patent och gör sitt yttersta för att maximera vinsterna från dem. 
Denna situation kan leda till evergreening.  
 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka lagligheten i evergreening genom 
att beskriva och analysera dess förhållande till artikel 102. Uppsatsen 
fokuserar främst på en av dessa strategier: lanseringen av en andra 
generationens medicin. Genom att marknadsföra en ny patenterad version av 
ett läkemedel vars patentskydd är på väg att löpa ut minimeras risken för att 
generikaföretag vinner marknadsandelar samtidigt som patenthavaren 
behåller sina höga försäljningssiffror och undviker en prisnedgång. 
Beroende på de åtgärder som vidtas vid lanseringen av en andra 
generationens medicin kan läkemedelsbolaget missbruka sin dominanta 
ställning och vara ansvarigt under artikel 102.  
 
Evergreening aktualiserar främst tre rättsområden: läkemedelsrätt, patenträtt 
och konkurrensrätt vilka kan tyckas svåra att förena på grund av de 
motstridiga syften som ligger bakom deras existens. Till exempel är 
förhållandet mellan immaterialrätt och konkurrensrätt sedan länge 
omdiskuterat, en debatt som intensifieras i läkemedelsbranschen. I denna 
uppsats kommer det visas att de båda disciplinerna endast är två olika 
verktyg som arbetar sida vida sida för att nå samma mål. Trots detta går det 
inte att bortse från att relationen dem emellan är komplicerad vilket gör en 
tillämpning av konkurrensreglerna på evergreening problematisk.  
 
För att avgöra hur långt en patentinnehavare kan gå tar uppsatsen sin 
utgångspunkt i det nyligen avgjorda AstraZeneca: det första fallet där ett 
läkemedelsbolag bötfälldes för missbruk av dominerande ställning på grund 
av evergreening i EU. Denna uppsats kommer fram till att evergreening kan, 
beroende på omständigheterna i det specifika fallet, utgöra ett brott mot 
artikel 102. I det avslutande kapitlet görs en analys av varför 
läkemedelsbolag ”evergreenar” sina patent och det föreslås att en reform av 
patentsystemet kan vara en framtida lösning.  
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Preface 
In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was sentenced by the mighty God Zeus to 
push a heavy stone up a high mountain. To complete his task, he had to use 
all his powers. Before Sisyphus could reach the top, however, the massive 
stone would always roll back down, forcing him to start all over again. 
Sisyphus became frustrated as he could not see an end to his work and felt 
like it would continue into eternity. In one version of the tale, Sisyphus 
continues the work for infinity. In another version, Sisyphus finds a way to 
escape his sentence. By deciding that the work was the most enjoyable thing 
one could do, Sisyphus did not feel like it was a punishment anymore.  
 
I felt like Sisyphus several times during the work with this thesis. None-
theless, some differences between my story and Sisyphus’s story should be 
pointed out. He did body work; my thesis (mostly) comes from intellectual 
work. Zeus sentenced Sisyphus to do his hard work; I took on all the hard 
work myself. And last, although I never felt like writing my thesis was the 
most enjoyable thing I could do during my last semester in Lund, I managed 
to accomplish something that I am actually rather proud of.  
 
There are also some similarities between me and Sisyphus. In times of 
despair, it felt like the work would continue into eternity. To finish it, I had 
to use all my powers. But by not giving up and deciding that the work 
would lead to something enjoyable (my law degree) it was not a punishment 
anymore. Thus, my story is similar to the second version but also differs in a 
significant way: I found a way to make my stone stay up that mountain. The 
result is presented in this paper.  
 
I am deeply grateful to my friends and colleagues in Lund and at the Faculty 
of Law. Without your endless love, encouragement and support I could 
never have finished this. A special thanks to Filippa, for putting up 
imaginary deadlines, Mathilda, my partner in competition, and Malin, for 
proof-reading.  
 
Also, I would like to thank my supervisor Hans Henrik Lidgard for valuable 
opinions and inputs to the discussions in this thesis.  
 
Lund, it has been a pleasure. Five years of studies have come to an end. I 
say goodbye with sadness in my heart, but fully aware that the best is yet to 
come.  
 
 
Lund, July 11, 2013 
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Abbreviations 
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TRIPS Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
In recent years, the pharmaceutical industry has undergone significant 
changes. A number of large pharmaceutical companies have lost patent 
protection for their lucrative blockbuster medicines and even though an in-
creased amount of money is spent on research and development (R&D), the 
companies seem to have difficulties to innovate new medicines. As a conse-
quence, they become increasingly dependent on their existing patents and do 
their utmost to maximize profits from them. This leads to different patent 
strategies, i.e. evergreening, which have the aim to extend the privileged 
position that a patentee holds during exclusivity. Such practices may be 
questioned from a competition law perspective.  
 
The law of patents confers exclusive rights; Article 102 in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position. The intersection between intellectual property law and 
competition law has been debated. Competition law imposes obligations 
where the holder of an intellectual property right (IPR) has a position of 
dominance on the relevant market, the IPR probably being the reason to 
why the company is dominant. When applied to the context of 
pharmaceutical patents, the issue becomes even more complex. 
Evergreening constitutes of different well-thought out tactics to use this 
exclusive right to its utmost, behaviour which most definitely balance at the 
border between lawful and unlawful conduct.   
 
In December 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 
all essentials upheld the Commission’s decision that the pharmaceutical 
company AstraZeneca had abused its dominant position by (mis) using both 
the patent system and regulatory procedures with the intent to delay or 
prevent market entry by generics. The judgment has attracted attention for a 
number of reasons. It was the first time that a pharmaceutical company was 
fined for an abuse of dominant position in relation to evergreening. 
Furthermore, it was one of the first occasions in which the CJEU tried the 
legality of strategic use of patent rights. The case is useful as a base when 
discussing the legality of different evergreening strategies in the 
pharmaceutical market.  
 
Since long, dominant companies have been under the obligation not to 
abuse their position of dominance but lately, as the concept gradually has 
widened, conduct close to legitimate business behaviour has been under the 
scrutiny of the European Union (EU) authorities. Thus, it has become 
increasingly difficult for pharmaceutical companies, holding a patent right, 
to know how far they can go. This thesis investigates where to draw the line 
between the use and the abuse of pharmaceutical patents with a focus on 
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evergreening. Is evergreening just a legitimate way of using a legally 
obtained right, or is it an abuse of dominance within the meaning of Article 
102?  
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the legality of evergreening. 
Evergreening may involve a variety of strategies adopted by patent holders. 
This thesis will mainly focus on the launch of second generation products 
but will also examine other strategies with the purpose to extend the 
privileged position that the patentee holds during exclusivity. With an 
objective approach, this study aims to describe and analyse the development 
and current state of Article 102 in relation to potentially unlawful conduct of 
pharmaceutical originator companies when using their patent rights.  
 
This thesis seeks to address the following research questions:  
 
- What concerns does evergreening give rise to under Article 102?  
- How far can a patent holder go when it comes to evergreening? 
1.3 Method and material 
This thesis investigates and analyses the applicable law in relation to 
evergreening by pharmaceutical companies by using a legal dogmatic 
method. A legal dogmatic method is a method where sources such as 
legislation, case law and doctrine are used to investigate the content of the 
applicable law. This method has been applied when describing the legal 
framework relevant to evergreening, i.e. chapter two, three and four. 
Primarily, this thesis looks at case-law, doctrine and official documents 
from the EU.  In chapter two, three and four, a descriptive method has been 
applied.  
 
In chapter five and six, the result of this thesis is presented and analysed. To 
some extent, chapter five provides the reader with new material on the 
application of Article 102. In these parts, a descriptive method has been 
applied. However, a more analytical approach has been used when 
discussing how this legal framework should be applied to evergreening and 
also when giving comments on how far a patent holder can go.  
 
In 2008, the Commission launched a sector inquiry into the pharmaceutical 
industry with the aim to uncover originator companies’ attempts to delay or 
prevent generic competition. The result was presented in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report in 2009, in which several 
practices by originator companies were identified as potentially anti-
competitive. This report has been used extensively to categorise and explain 
evergreening strategies in chapter five, although it is acknowledged that the 
report is neither a statement of the law or guidance on its application.  
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In addition to the traditional legal dogmatic method, a law and politics 
perspective has been applied. A law and politics perspective involves a more 
broad analysis of the reasons for the current development in case law and 
the interests that have been taken into account when reaching conclusions in 
these cases. Also, this method has been used in chapter five and six when 
making some tentative suggestions for a way forward.   
 
Furthermore, a law and economics perspective has been used to some 
extent. A law and economics perspective is used to explain the economic 
effects of the law. The purpose with applying such a perspective is to 
analyse the effects of the law from an economic point of view.  For 
example, this method has been used when explaining the reasons to why 
companies turn to evergreening.   
 
In this thesis, evaluation of sources has been done continuously. In the more 
general descriptive parts, the main sources used are Whish and Bailey’s 
Competition Law (2012) and Hans Henrik Lidgard’s Competition Classics 
(2011). These standard books on the subject must be seen as independent 
and unbiased. In the more specific parts dealing with evergreening, a more 
critical approach has been deemed necessary due to the large number of 
articles and the small number of established doctrine.  
1.4 Delimitations 
Several limitations to this thesis need to be acknowledged. This thesis will 
focus on evergreening of patents by pharmaceutical companies. Hence, a 
limitation is made to the pharmaceutical sector. Given the latest 
developments in the sector, having in mind the Commission’s Pharma 
Report and the CJEU’s AstraZeneca case, such a limitation seems the most 
reasonable. Thus, the thesis will solely focus on the use and abuse of 
pharmaceutical patents, even though the same general principles should be 
applicable in other sectors of the economy.  
 
The thesis focuses on the prohibition against abusive unilateral behaviour 
under Article 102. There are similar practices e.g. patent settlements1 which 
may be unlawful under Article 101 TFEU. These practices are equally 
interesting from a competition law perspective but will not be dealt with in 
this thesis.  
 
Furthermore, exploitative abuse of dominance falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. Exploitative abuse has a detrimental effect on consumers, for 
example by charging them excessive prices. Without ignoring the 
importance of preventing such behaviour, exclusionary conduct that 
excludes competitors from the market, and thereby prevents effective 
competition, is more relevant for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
                                                
1 Patent settlements have been identified as potentially anti-competitive in the 
Commission’s Pharma Report, see paras 702 – 855.  
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Also, without ignoring the importance of the other prerequisites in Article 
102, focus will be on the assessment of whether a dominant position exists 
and how to examine whether that position has been abused or not. This 
thesis will assume that the other prerequisites of Article 102 are fulfilled.  
 
Also, evergreening may encompass strategies concerning the relationship 
between originator companies.2 In this thesis, such strategies will not be 
dealt with. Instead, focus will be on the relationship between originator 
companies and generic companies.  
 
This thesis will exclusively investigate the European legal framework on a 
Union level. The reason to this limitation is the extensive harmonisation 
process that has taken place between EU law and national laws. Therefore, 
an investigation into national laws is deemed unnecessary for the purpose of 
the thesis.  
 
Lastly, a comment should be made on the essay’s selection of evergreening 
strategies. Evergreening strategies are numerous and an exhaustive 
enumeration of such strategies is not possible. In this essay, the author has 
chosen to investigate patent litigation, patent clusters and second generation 
products. The selection was partly due to that they were examined in the 
Commission’s recently launched Pharma Report. They also share in 
common that they may be forbidden under Article 102 while other 
evergreening strategies, such as patent settlements, may be forbidden under 
Article 101, why it was considered an appropriate choice.  
1.5 Terminology 
In December 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
entered into force. As a consequence, a combination of the old Article 82 
and the new Article 102 is used in case law and doctrine. In this essay, 
reference is continuously made to the new Article 102. Furthermore, when 
making references to the Court of Justice of the European Union, formerly 
known as the ECJ, the new abbreviation CJEU will be used continuously.  
  
The use of the term evergreening seems to vary in doctrine. In this thesis, 
evergreening is a general term, referring to all legal or illegal strategies that 
a company conducts in order to extend the benefits of their patent right. The 
same sort of conduct will also be referred to as strategic patent planning. By 
using these terms in the thesis, no negative connotation is intended, as 
conduct should be valued on the basis of the criteria in Article 102.  
 
When using the term second generation product, the thesis refers to a 
product which results from innovation essentially based upon that of an 
existing product which has essentially the same mode of action. No negative 
                                                
2 For a detailed review of patent strategies in the relationship between originator companies, 
see the Pharma Report C3.   
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connotation is intended when using this term, since patentability should be 
valued by the patentability criteria in the applicable patent law.   
 
The thesis distinguish between patents covering inventions consisting of 
new active substances, referred to as primary patents, and patents covering 
inventions which are the result of subsequent, incremental innovation, 
referred to as secondary patents.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, a pharmaceutical company is understood as a 
company that produces, markets and/or sell medicinal products. These 
entities are also referred to as pharmaceutical undertakings.   
1.6 Disposition 
This paper has been divided into six chapters. Following this introductory 
chapter, the second chapter will give the reader an overview of the thesis’ 
subject matter by providing an outline of the pharmaceutical sector and its 
main features. Also, a comment on the relationship between IPR and 
competition law in the sector is made. In addition, this chapter contains an 
introduction to the concept of evergreening.  
 
In chapter three, the law of patents is reviewed. First, a comment on the 
rationale of patents is made. The procedure and requirements when 
obtaining a patent needs to be identified in order to examine whether ever-
greening of such patents is abusive, why the regulatory framework is 
outlined. Also, a short comment on patenting in the pharmaceutical sector is 
made.   
 
Chapter four describes the development and current state of Article 102. 
After a short introduction to the concept of abuse of dominant position, a 
rather extensive presentation of the objective of Article 102 is provided.  
The, the thesis presents how the actual assessment of whether an abuse 
exists or not is conducted. The aim with this chapter, in conjunction with 
chapter two and three, is to provide a base for the discussion and analysis in 
chapter five and six.   
 
In chapter five, evergreening strategies are discussed. The chapter begins 
with a comprehensive presentation of the concept of evergreening, 
whereupon a discussion on the application of Article 102 to such conduct 
follows. This chapter aims at presenting three sorts of evergreening 
strategies as well as the potential anti-competitive effects they may have.  
 
In the concluding chapter six, the result of this study is summarized and 
conclusions are drawn. In this part, the thesis seeks to analyse the 
evergreening strategies presented, with the aim to provide guidelines on 
their legality under competition law. The author will also make some 
general comments on the findings in the thesis and, if possible, some 
recommendations for further research.  
 10 
2 Main Features of the  
Pharmaceutical Sector  
2.1 Introduction 
The pharmaceutical sector is influenced by elements from different legal 
disciplines including pharmaceutical regulatory law, competition law and 
intellectual property law. These areas of law have different policy objectives 
which needs to be united in order to create a favourable climate for 
innovation of new and better medicines.3 The relationship between those 
will be outlined in this chapter.  
 
When discussing evergreening of pharmaceutical patents, there are some 
important differences between the pharmaceutical sector and other sectors 
which are necessary to take into account. This section will highlight these 
differences by giving an overview of the pharmaceutical industry and its 
main features. In addition, an introduction to the concept of evergreening 
will be provided with an explanation to why there is an inherent tension 
between IPRs and competition law in the pharmaceutical sector.  
2.2 Main features and market structure of the 
pharmaceutical sector  
The pharmaceutical sector is an essential part of the European economy, its 
market for prescription and non-prescription medicine being worth over 
€138 billion ex-factory and €214 billion at retail prices in 2007.4 In the same 
year, every European spent an average of €430 on medicine, making access 
to affordable and safe medicine essential to the health of Europe’s citizens.5 
With the global pharmaceuticals market being worth $US 300 billion a year, 
a number expected to rise to $US 400 billion within three years,6 it is not 
surprising that the industry attains a lot of attention.  
 
The pharmaceutical sector is one of the world’s most research-intensive 
industries. Because of high expenditures on R&D and clinical tests, 
combined with the fact that new products are easily imitated, patent 
protection is crucial.7 As will be shown in this thesis, patent protection 
usually leads to a monopoly on the relevant market, giving the patent owner 
significant market power over supply and price. Therefore, the market is 
highly regulated to guarantee the safety and efficiency of the medicine that 
                                                
3 Priddis & Constantine (2011) p. 241.    
4 Executive Summary of the Pharma Report, p. 1.  
5 Ibid, p. 1.  
6 WTO., Trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and health: Pharmaceutical Industry, retrieved 
2013-05-20, <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/>. 
7 Domeij (1998) p. 1.  
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is available for consumers on the market. Also, price levels are negotiated 
on a national level before the medicine is approved for marketing.8  
 
The existence and scope of patent laws have varied over time and place. 
According to Boldrin and Levine, a modern pharmaceutical industry was 
developed faster in countries with weak patent laws. For example, in most 
European countries, only the process of producing a medicine but not the 
product could be patented for many years. Not until the late twentieth-
century did most countries allow patents on the actual product. In the US, on 
the contrary, patents on pharmaceuticals have always been granted.9  
According to Boldrin and Levine, the European pharmaceutical industry has 
not been affected in a negative way. Instead, it was the European industry 
which was world leading for many years.10 Still today, the global 
pharmaceutical market is geographically concentrated. The ten largest 
pharmaceutical companies are based in the developed world: six of them in 
the US and four of them in Europe.11 The explanation is simple: a new 
pharmaceutical is expensive to develop and as a consequence, the initial 
price for it will be high. Only companies with the financial strength can 
afford the cost of innovation and only consumers in rich countries can 
afford to buy them.12  
 
Recent developments in the pharmaceutical industry spurred the 
Commission to make an inquiry into the sector in 2008.13 A decline in 
innovation had been noticed at the same time as several medicines were 
going off patent without being replaced by new bestsellers. The result of the 
inquiry was presented in a report in July 2009.14 The report was limited to 
prescription medicine for human use in the 27 Member States of the EU. 
The report concludes that companies in the pharmaceutical sector apply 
defensive patenting strategies, which creates obstacles for generic 
competitors to enter the market. Moreover, it is suggested that when these 
measures have the object to delay or prevent generic entry, their 
compatibility with competition law may be questioned.  
2.2.1 The undertakings  
The structure of the global pharmaceutical market is unique: it consists of a 
small number of large companies, a large number of small companies and 
an almost non-existence of medium-sized companies.15 Furthermore, it has a 
two-tier structure. The first tier is comprised of innovative pharmaceutical 
companies (hereafter “originators”), often large and multinational, holding 
                                                
8 Pharma Report, para 337. 
9 Boldrin & Levine (2008) p. 215.  
10 Ibid, p. 218.  
11 WTO., Trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and health: Pharmaceutical Industry, retrieved 
2013-05-20, <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/>. 
12 Boldrin & Levine (2008) p. 213.  
13 The legal basis for a sector inquiry is Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 on the application 
of the EC Treaty competition rules (Articles 101 and 102). 
14 Pharma Report.    
15 Taggart (1993) p. 4.  
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patents to best-selling prescription drugs. The second tier is comprised of 
generic companies, which produce generic versions of a medicine when the 
patent has expired.16 In addition to this, a third tier is emerging: the 
biotechnology companies. These companies dedicate their efforts to 
innovation and usually lack the ability to produce or market pharmaceuticals 
to consumers. These companies usually partner with originator companies 
for the later steps in the development and most often in the actual marketing 
of the medicine.17 
 
Between originators, competition is mainly in the innovative step. Their 
R&D activities aim at developing a new medicine or enhancing an already 
existing medicine in order to stay competitive.18 Moreover, competition 
occurs between originators and generic companies. When a pharmaceutical 
product goes off patent, generic versions will appear on the market which 
are manufactured and marketed by generic companies. These companies 
generally compete on the merits of price of the medicine and therefore 
invest less or no money on R&D.19 
 
Today, the division between originators and generic companies is not as 
rigid as it used to be. This is especially true in emerging markets like 
Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America where consumers cannot afford the 
expensive brand-name drugs.20 For example, in 2011, AstraZeneca acquired 
the Chinese company Guangdong BeiKang Pharmaceutical Company Ltd, a 
privately-owned generics manufacturing company.21 Furthermore, Sanofi 
has acquired the generic companies Zentiva, Kendrick and Medley, all 
operating in emerging markets.22 
2.2.2 The market 
The pharmaceutical sector is subject to extensive regulation. Primarily, state 
intervention is justified by the need to ensure safety and efficiency of the 
medicine being sold. The government may also intervene to regulate price-
levels and the channels in which pharmaceuticals are marketed and sold.23 
For example, pharmaceutical companies are limited when it comes to price-
setting of their products. Usually, the state is the largest purchaser of 
pharmaceuticals which is why the decisions of their institutions have a 
direct impact on the economic incentives of pharmaceutical companies.24 
                                                
16 Gunther & Breuvart (2005) p. 669.  
17 Domeij (1998) p. 7.  
18 Gunther & Breuvart (2005) p. 669.  
19 Priddis & Constantine (2011) p. 248. 
20 Singer, Natasha., “Drug Firms Apply Brand to Generics”, The New York Times, 15 
February 2010. 
21 AstraZeneca, “AstraZeneca to acquire generics company to broaden patient access to 
medicines in China”, retrieved 2013-05-26 at <www.astrazeneca.com/Media/Press-re-
leases/Article/20111208--astrazeneca-to-acquire-generics-company> 
22 Sanofi, ”Generics”, retrieved 2013-05-26 
<en.sanofi.com/products/generics/generics.aspx> 
23 Priddis & Constantine (2011) p. 248. 
24 Ibid, p. 249. 
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Although price and reimbursement levels are a national competence, almost 
all Member States require that the price is determined before introduction on 
the market for prescription drugs funded under the social security system.25  
In addition, all measures must comply with Directive 89/105/EC.26 Since the 
main consumers of pharmaceuticals are national health care systems, there 
is a great incentive to keep prices low in order to control budget costs and 
keep taxation low.27  
 
Furthermore, pharmaceutical markets suffer from a significant market 
failure. The doctor who prescribes the medicine does not pay for it; the 
patient, or in some countries the social security system, which pays for the 
medicine does not choose it. Thus, the market suffers from a price 
disconnect where the consumer does not make the usual price/quality trade-
off that constitutes a significant part of a competitive market.28 As a 
consequence, doctors are only slightly sensitive to the price of medicines 
when prescribing them.29 Pharmaceutical companies seem to be fully aware 
of this and therefore heavily promote their products directly to doctors.30 
The phenomena is referred to as detailing which entails promotional visits to 
prescribing doctors with the purpose to increase the prescription of the 
detailing company’s medicine.31  
2.2.3 The key role of innovation 
Another defining feature of the pharmaceutical sector is that it is usually 
described as technology intensive and highly innovative.32 The sector has 
one of the highest investments in R&D in the EU.33 Originator companies 
spent an average of 17 % of their turnover on R&D in the years 2000-2007. 
In contrast, 23 % was spent on marketing and promotion activities during 
the same years.34 Hence, marketing expenditure exceeds expenditure on R & 
D, an interesting aspect to keep in mind for chapter five and the analysis in 
chapter six.       
 
In order to stay competitive and profitable, research-based pharmaceutical 
companies must develop new and improved substances.35 But the 
pharmaceutical sector is risky business: R&D projects are often lengthy and 
uncertain with a low success rate. It has been estimated that only 1 in 5,000–
10,000 compounds actually reach the market as a medicine. Also, the 
timeline for bringing a new medicine to the market is long; usually it takes 
                                                
25 Pharma Report, paras 337-395.  
26 Directive 89/105/EEC, pp. 8-11.  
27 Hunter (2001) p. 10.  
28 Shadowen et al. (2011) pp. 700-701.   
29 Case T 321/05, Astra Zeneca, para 34.   
30 Shadowen et al. (2010).   
31 OECD, “Competition and Regulation in the Pharmaceutical Industry”, p. 7.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Executive Summary of the Pharma Report, p. 1.  
34 Ibid, p. 7 f. 
35 Gunther & Breuvart (2005) p. 670.  
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10-12 years from initial discovery to the actual launch on the market.36 
Since stakes are high, the business is dependent on profits from the products 
that actually reach the market in order to recoup their investments.37  
 
Even small therapeutic improvements to an existing product can lead to 
increased profitability.38 This is usually referred to as incremental 
innovation, a practice most originator companies engage in.39 Incremental 
innovation means innovation of a product that results from subsequent, 
follow-up R & D, essentially based on an existing product which in essence 
have the same mode of action. The result is a second-generation product, 
also referred to as a “follow-on product”.40  
 
Today, some originators involve less in R&D than they used to. Instead, 
they rely on the acquisition of new compounds from the biotechnology 
companies. In 2007, around 35 % of the formulas pending for a marketing 
authorisation had been bought or in-licensed.41 It seems like innovation has 
“moved down one level”. Potentially, biotechnology companies could do 
even more innovation in the future while the large originator companies take 
care of putting the medicine on the market.   
 
The profit imperative leads to some unwanted effects on the pharmaceutical 
market. There have been some accusations against the choice of where to 
invest R&D. As a result of the high costs for the innovation of a new 
medicine, the drugs chosen for development are the drugs that are most 
likely to provide a high return on the company’s investment. This result in 
companies investing their money into research for drugs used in the 
developed world, while drugs sold in the developing world are not 
prioritized.42   
2.3 The introduction of a new pharmaceutical on 
the market 
The life cycle of a pharmaceutical can be divided into three phases: the pre-
launch period, the marketing and sales period and a later period when the 
patent protection expires and generic entry is possible.43 All steps of the 
product’s commercialization are regulated: a myriad of rules for 
pharmaceutical companies to navigate in.  
 
The introduction of a pharmaceutical product to the market is made subject 
to the grant of a marketing authorisation, a process for which rules are 
                                                
36 Priddis & Constantine (2011) p. 243-244.    
37 Gunther & Breuvart (2005) p. 670. 
38 Domeij (1998) p. 7.  
39 Pharma Report, para 987.  
40 Ibid, para 990. 
41 Executive Summary of the Pharma Report, p. 8. 
42 WTO., Trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and health: Pharmaceutical Industry, retrieved 
2013-05-20, <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/>. 
43 Pharma Report, para 128.  
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primarily laid down in Directive 2001/83/EC.44 The application is filed with 
the competent authority in the Member State where the company wishes to 
market the pharmaceutical.45 If a company wishes to introduce the 
pharmaceutical on several national markets, the Member State which first 
granted a marketing authorisation shall act as a reference state, simplifying 
the application.46 To obtain a marketing authorisation, the results of 
extensive pre-clinical tests and clinical trials must be accounted for.47 These 
tests can be both costly and lengthy and as a consequence, the time period 
that elapses between a patent being granted and the actual launch of the 
product to the market may be significant.48 Once a medicine has been 
authorised and is placed on the market, its safety and efficiency is monitored 
through the EU system of pharmacoviligance.49 The purpose of 
pharmacoviligance is to identify previously undetected adverse drug 
reactions and, if any, propose improvements of the medicine. 50     
 
Advertising is used extensively51 and is subject to the same minimum rules 
as the advertising of other products. There are also special rules for 
advertising of pharmaceuticals in Directive 92/28/EEC. For example, 
advertising of prescription drugs is not permitted.52 Furthermore, detailing 
i.e. promotion and marketing directed against prescribing doctors, needs to 
comply with certain rules in the Directive. For example, it must include 
detailed information of the product53 and may not include gifts, pecuniary 
advantages or benefits in any kind.54   
2.4 Generic entry  
Generic versions of a pharmaceutical are allowed to enter the market on 
patent expiry of the original medicine. The entry of generics usually leads to 
a decrease in price and an increase in supply. Therefore, legislation is 
designed to simplify and encourage the entry for these companies by 
offering an abridged route to achieve a marketing authorisation. By using 
the originator medicine as a reference, the generic company saves time and 
is able to enter the market more rapidly.55 Also, the generic company does 
not have to invest money in expensive R&D and does not have other costs 
related to innovation of medicines.  
 
 
 
                                                
44 Directive 2001/83/EC as amended by Directive 2010/84/EU. 
45 Ibid, Article 6.  
46 Ibid, Article 28. 
47 Ibid, Article 8 (3i). 
48 Pharma Report, para 142.  
49 Directive 2001/83/EC. 
50 Smillie (2012) p. 265.  
51 Ibid, p. 193.    
52 Directive 92/28/EEC, Article 3 (1). 
53 Ibid, Article 6 (1). 
54 Ibid, Article 9. 
55 Westin II 2011, p. 596.  
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Directive 2001/83/EC define a generic as  
 
“a medicinal product which has the same qualitative and 
quantitative composition in active substances and the same 
pharmaceutical form as the reference medicinal product, and whose 
bioequivalence with the reference medicinal product has been 
demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies.”56  
 
Before 2005, a generic company could only use the originator 
pharmaceutical as a reference, and thereby benefit from the abridged 
procedure, if the original product was still on the market. Today, a generic 
company can take advantage of a marketing authorisation up to eight years 
after a withdrawal of the original marketing authorisation.57 Also, and most 
importantly, a generic company is not required to conduct pre-clinical tests 
and clinical trials to obtain a marketing authorisation. As long as the generic 
company can demonstrate that the product is bioequivalent with the 
reference product it will be approved.58 
 
Bioequivalence can be demonstrated in two alternative ways. Either, the 
generic company relies on an existing marketing authorisation in line with 
the procedure explained above. The other possibility is to demonstrate that 
the active substances have been in well-established use in the EU for at least 
ten years, with recognised efficacy and an acceptable level of safety through 
published scientific documentation.59 The latter is obviously more complex 
and time-consuming. In the case of AstraZeneca,60 discussed in chapter four 
and five, this was of great significance.  
2.4.1 The impact of generic competition 
The factors that affect the impact of generic entry are numerous. The 
Pharma Report suggests that the turnover of the branded medicine before 
patent expiry may play a role. Countries that oblige pharmacies to substitute 
a medicine for a generic version if the generic is cheaper have earlier 
generic entry. Also, generic entry seems to be faster if the Member State 
does not enforce a certain price cap on the generic version.61  
 
The impact of generic entry on the pharmaceutical market can be divided 
into two sections: the extent of entry and the effect of entry. The extent of 
generic entry was investigated in the Pharma Report in the years 2000 - 
2007. The report found that half of the products faced generic competition 
within the first year of loss of protection. On an average, generic entry 
happened within seven months. For the best-selling medicines, average 
                                                
56 Directive 2001/83/EC, Article 10 (2b).  
57 Ibid, Article 10.  
58 Ibid, Article 10 (1).  
59 Ibid, Article 10 (a). 
60 Case C-457/10 P, Astra Zeneca. 
61 Executive Summary of the Pharma Report, p. 9.  
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generic entry happened within four months. In most cases, generic 
competition has the effect of lower prices. According to the Sector Inquiry, 
generic versions were sold at a price 25 % below the price of the original 
product before loss of exclusivity. In a year, the price was 40 % lower. The 
inquiry also found that the price of the previously patented product 
decreased. According to the Pharma Report, savings could have been even 
greater if generic entry would have occurred at an earlier stage.62  
2.4.2 Generic substitution 
Generic substitution is a popular political tool to increase the use of 
generics. By allowing or obliging pharmacies to exchange a prescribed 
medicine in cases when there is a cheaper generic version available, 
government spending on reimbursed drugs can be decreased.63 Another 
purpose of generic substitution is to change certain prescribing habits by 
doctors.64 However, generic substitution does not apply to generics of 
different dosages, different formulations or different delivery systems.65 
 
In Sweden, mandatory generic substitution was introduced in 2002. The 
substitution is not carried out if the prescriber of the drug has objected the 
exchange or if the patient pays the price gap between the generic and 
original medicine.66 In Sweden, generic substitution has led to lower prices 
on pharmaceuticals which no longer benefit from patent protection. In an 
article, published in Läkartidningen in 2007, the authors provide proof for 
this observation and in addition, argue that doctors have changed their 
prescription habits after the introduction of generic substitution.67 
2.5 Intellectual property rights and competition 
law in the pharmaceutical sector 
The relationship between IPRs and competition law has been a long-running 
debate. Considering the essential character of both disciplines; IPRs confer 
an exclusive right upon its owner whereas the primary goal with 
competition law is to keep competition on the market free, it has been 
suggested that they are inherently in conflict.68  
  
To make the issue a bit clearer: by being granted an intellectual property 
right, e.g. a patent, the owner receives an exclusive right to exploit his or her 
patent for a limited period of time. This exclusive right includes the right to 
exclude others from exploiting the patent. Depending on the circumstances, 
e.g. availability of substitutes in the market, the patentee may hold a 
                                                
62 Executive Summary of the Pharma Report, p. 9.  
63 Domeij, Bengt (2013) p. 135.    
64 Ibid, p. 135.    
65 O’Donoghue & Padilla (2006) p. 531. 
66 See Lag (2002:160) om läkemedelsförmåner mm. 21 §.   
67 Lundin, Jacob, Engström, ”Generikareformen pressade läkemedelspriserna” 
LäkarTidningen, vol 104, nr 9, 2007. 
68 Anderman (2011) p. 4.  
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monopoly, or at least dominance, on the market since he or she is the only 
one who can manufacture, sell and market the product. This inevitably leads 
to concerns from a competition law perspective since its main goal is to 
keep competition free.69 One of these concerns is the unilateral conduct of a 
company in a dominant position, a position possibly attained through the 
possession of an exclusive right. In order to ensure that these companies do 
not misuse their exclusive right, Article 102 put certain restrictions on their 
freedom of action.  
 
One could come to the conclusion that competition law and intellectual 
property law contradict one another. But this seems to be a simplistic and 
false conclusion. Instead, it seems to be generally accepted that intellectual 
property law and competition law are just two means to the same end.70 The 
disciplines share the same objective of promoting consumer welfare and an 
efficient allocation of resources with the ultimate aim to bring new and 
better products to consumers at the lowest possible price.71 As emphasized 
in the Commission’s Guidelines on the application of Article 10172 
“innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic component of an open and 
effective market economy.”  
 
Intellectual property law strikes a balance between over- and under-
protection of an innovator’s innovation, whereas competition law works as a 
safety net that unfolds when that balance is called into question. But even 
though it can be concluded that intellectual property law and competition 
law are not inherently in conflict, the innate tension between the disciplines 
cannot be ignored. Therefore, the matter is rather to determine at what point 
the exercise of an IPR is so harmful that competition law should intervene.73 
Evergreening of pharmaceutical patents may be a scenario in which the 
balance between over- and under-protection is threatened. Following is an 
introduction to evergreening in the context of the pharmaceutical market.   
2.6 Evergreening of pharmaceutical patents  
Evergreening involves a variety of strategies adopted by patent holders 
when their valuable patent rights are about to expire. Such strategies aim at 
extending the privileged position that a patentee holds during exclusivity. 
Evergreening tactics are especially common in the pharmaceutical 
industry.74  On patent expiry, originator companies are met with competition 
from generic companies which most often leads to a decline in price and 
demand for the branded product.75 In order to meet this competition, 
originator companies adopt countermeasures to protect their market 
position. These tactics have been named several things: most often 
                                                
69 Whish & Bailey (2012) p. 769 ff. 
70 Jones & Sufrin (2011) p. 711, see also Pepperkorn (2003) pg. 527-528.  
71 Whish & Bailey (2012) pp. 769 -770.  
72 Commission Guidelines on Technology Transfer, para 7.  
73 Whish & Bailey (2009) p. 770.  
74 Shadowen et al. (2011) p. 698.  
75 Executive Summary of the Pharma Report, p. 9. 
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evergreening but also “life-cycle strategies” or “strategic patent planning.”76  
 
In its Pharma Report, the Commission refers to such methods as “life cycle 
management strategies”. These different strategies work as “a tool-box” for 
originator companies with the goal of maximizing the return from their 
pharmaceutical products.77 The report suggests a variety of such strategies 
as potentially anti-competitive, including patent clusters, patent litigation, 
life cycle strategies for follow-on products and interventions before national 
regulatory authorities.78  
 
These strategies have two broad aims: to extend the time in which the 
pharmaceutical product enjoys market exclusivity and to maintain or expand 
the market share in the market in which the product acts. This might have a 
negative impact on generic competition, hindering its emergence to the 
market and also by having a detrimental effect on the supply and price of 
medicine, especially in developing countries.79 Although ethical aspects of 
such strategies can be discussed, this thesis will focus on the legal 
uncertainties. Evergreening will be further investigated in chapter five.  
 
 
                                                
76 See for example Domeij (2013) p. 163.  
77 Pharma Report, para 466.  
78 Ibid, para 1557.  
79 Correa (2012) p. 749.  
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3 Patents on Pharmaceuticals 
3.1 Introduction 
Patents are the backbone of the research-based pharmaceutical sector, 
making the industry one of the main users of the patent system.80 However, 
there used to be a universal principle, stating that patents could not be 
granted for medicines since it was seen as inappropriate to grant a single 
entity the exclusive right to a product that could mean the difference 
between life and death. Today, often justified by a more nuanced application 
of the patent law system, almost all countries allow patents on 
pharmaceutical products.81  
 
The following chapter will mainly deal with two issues relating to 
pharmaceutical patents: the object behind patents and the regulatory 
framework applicable when obtaining a patent. Considering the scope of 
this thesis, it is not possible, neither necessary, to exhaustively deal with the 
substantive law of patents. Therefore, this section will focus on giving the 
reader an overview presentation to patent law which can be used as a 
reference point for the upcoming discussion and analysis.  
3.2 General on patents  
A patent is a form of intellectual property. The patent gives its owner the 
exclusive right, conferred by law, to exploit the innovation, in exchange for 
public disclosure of the patent.82 A patent right means that the owner has the 
exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented product, including the 
right to prevent others from exploiting the product. In Europe, patent 
protection lasts for 20 years from the date of the filing the application.83  
 
Applying for a patent is the first step in the process of introducing a new 
medicine on the market, ensuring that it is the inventor and not his or hers 
competitors who reap the rewards of the invention. In the pharmaceutical 
sector, an application for a patent is usually filed when the substance has 
been made and a pharmacological effect can be established.84 The Pharma 
Report suggests that the time for applying may be as early as during the 
research stage of developing the medicine. For most originator companies, 
however, patenting continues throughout all stages of development and even 
after the first launch of the product.85 At what point the most favourable 
time to apply for a patent occurs is a difficult question. The inventor has to 
                                                
80 Executive Summary of the Pharma Report, p. 9.  
81 Levin (2011) p. 272 ff.  
82 Korah (2007) p. 24.  
83 EPC Article 63, see also TRIPS Article 33.  
84 Domeij (1998) p. 1.  
85 Pharma Report, para 443. 
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consider the risk of competitors filing a patent application for the same 
substance before him or her and weigh it towards the financial benefits of 
waiting, considering the additional profits that every extra day of selling a 
medicine will bring.86  
3.3 The rationale for patents  
The most common argument in support of patent protection is the need to 
create incentives for innovation. Innovation is desirable since it stimulates 
economic growth and leads to greater efficiency. Innovative companies are 
incentivized to make the necessary investments in R&D by the promise of 
monopoly rights.87 This argument can be illustrated by Abraham Lincoln’s 
statement that patent law:  
 
“[...] secured to the inventor, for a limited time, the exclusive use of 
his invention; and thereby added the fuel of interest to the fire of 
genius, in the discovery and production of new and useful things.”88  
 
The exclusive right is a remedy for the financial risks that the companies in 
the research-based pharmaceutical industry take. It is clear that 
pharmaceuticals need to be covered by favourable rules, providing for 
sufficient protection, in order for costly and lengthy R&D to be facilitated.       
 
Patents can also bring benefits to society as a whole. When the patent 
becomes public, as all patents do, the information in the application 
becomes available to anyone. By doing so, the technological and scientific 
knowledge available to the public is increased and may be used for the 
purpose of further research.89 Hopefully, this information leads to further 
innovation and the development of new inventions. In this way, patents do 
not only foster innovation for the patent owner, but also more favourable 
conditions for competitors to innovate. Thereby, patents may ultimately 
improve competition.90 Ultimately, innovation is also good for the consumer 
since increased competition will lead to lower prices, better products, wider 
choice and greater efficiency, as will be explained in chapter four.  
 
However, the benefits of patents have been questioned. Although incentives 
are necessary for innovation to exist, concern has been expressed that too 
many and too broad patents are being granted and that patents might not 
actually lead to more innovation. For example, Boldrin and Levine are 
                                                
86 Domeij (1998) p. 1.  
87 European Commission, <ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/>, retrieved 2013-
05-14.  
88 Abraham Lincoln., Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions, p. 357.  
89 Pharma Report, para 255. A patent does not include a right to exclude others from using 
the invention for the purpose of further research. This is often referred to as the “research 
exemption” which is a well-established principle of patent law that should apply world-
wide, or at least in the European countries. In the Swedish Patent Law, this provision is 
provided in 3 § 3 st. 3 p. PL. For further reading, see Domeij (1998) p. 457 ff.  
90 Pharma Report, para 255.  
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sceptical to patents. According to the authors, patents produce what they call 
“IP-inefficiency”. The authors conclude that IPRs are an unnecessary evil, 
since there is no evidence that its desired purpose of increasing innovation is 
achieved.91 Boldrin and Levine go as far as calling IPRs a “cancer” that 
needs to get cut off entirely.92  
3.4 Regulatory framework 
Modern patent laws are complex and comprise of complicated technical 
and legal aspects. As of today, there is no coherent EU patent that can be 
obtained for the entire EU. This is about to change. Since long, it has been 
under discussion in the EU whether to establish a unitary patent and a 
unitary patent court. In December 2012, 25 of the 27 Member States agreed 
to create a unitary patent with a unitary effect, the first to be granted in 
April 2014.93 This “EU Patent Package” is predicted to reduce the cost of 
patent applications and lessen the administrative burden for patent 
authorities.94 
 
Today, innovations can receive patent protection in three ways: (1) by a 
national patent, as granted by the competent national authority in each 
Member State, (2) by a European patent granted by the European Patent 
Office (EPO), (3) by using the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) where the 
applicant designates one patent office as a reference office which then 
transmits the application to the other Member States that the applicant 
wishes to obtain a patent in.  
3.4.1 International agreements 
The Paris Convention (ParC), signed in 1883, was one of the first 
international treaties for the protection of IPRs. One of the most important 
provisions is the right to priority.95 The right to priority means that if an 
applicant is granted a patent in one of the convention states, the same 
applicant may, within a limited period of six or twelve months, apply for 
protection in other convention states, with a reference to the first patent.96  
 
                                                
91 Boldrin & Levine (2008) p. 11.  
92 Ibid, p. 264.  
93 All Member States have signed the “EU Patent Package” except Spain and Italy.  The 
international agreement creating a unified patent court will enter into force on 1 January 
2014 or after 13 contracting states ratify it. For more information see 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20121210IPR04506/html/Parliament
-approves-EU-unitary-patent-rules>. 
94Speech by Commissioner Barnier, delivered on 11 December 2012, MEMO/12/97. 
95 See ParC Article 4 (A1): “Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent, or 
for the registration of a utility model, or of an industrial design, or of a trademark, in one of 
the countries of the Union, or his successor in title, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in 
the other countries, a right of priority during the periods hereinafter fixed.” 
96 Muir et al. (1999) p. 1.  
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The PCT was established in 1970. PCT is a special agreement within the 
terms of Article 19 ParC.97 The purpose of establishing the Treaty was to 
simplify the process of obtaining individual patents in more than one 
country by providing a unified procedure for filing patent applications.98 
Today, the PCT has 147 contracting states, Saudi-Arabia being the most 
recent.99 
 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law 
(TRIPS) is an international treaty, signed in 1998, applicable to all countries 
which are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). TRIPS 
requires its contracting states to comply with basic rules. For example, 
patent protection for 20 years is mandatory in all Member States.100  
 
The European Patent Convention (EPC) was established in 1973, and 
contains rules on patents within Europe.101 EPC is also a special agreement, 
created with support of Article 19 ParC.102 Albeit Member States have their 
own national systems of laws, an extensive harmonisation has been 
achieved by the Convention and today, the Member States patent laws are to 
a large extent corresponding with the EPC.103 After a substantive 
examination of the product’s patentability, a European patent is granted by 
the competent authority EPO.104 Once granted, the European patent turns 
into bundle of national patents and, according to Article 64, confers the 
same exclusive right as a national patent. Also, all national patents are 
subject to national laws and national enforcement.105 
3.4.2 Requirements to obtain a pharmaceutical patent   
A patent can cover a product (e.g. a molecule), a process (e.g. how this 
molecule is manufactured), or a medical indication (the effect the molecule 
has on the human body).106 Article 52 EPC (1) dictates the criteria for 
patentability. A European patent will be granted if the invention is (1) novel, 
(2) contains an inventive step and (3) has industrial application. The 
patentability requirements are applied strictly objective and without any 
consideration of the applicant’s intent to receive a patent.107 
 
                                                
97 Muir et al. (1999) p. 2. 
98 Levin (2011) p. 47.  
99 http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/brief/index.html, retrieved 2013-05-28.  
100 TRIPS Article 33.  
101 The Convention on the Grant of European Patents of October 5, 1973. Amended by the 
act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and by decisions of the Administrative 
Council of the European Patent Organisation of 21 December 1978, 13 December 1994, 20 
October 1995, 5 December 1996, 10 December 1998 and 27 October 2005.  
102 Muir et al. (1999) p. 2. 
103 See for example the Swedish Patent Law 1, 2 §§. 
104 EPC Article 4.   
105 Whish & Bailey (2011) p. 768.  
106 Levin (2011)  p. 273.  
107 EPO Comments on the Pharma Report, p. 6.  
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When it comes to pharmaceuticals, the novelty requirement is the most 
important to consider. An invention is considered to be new if it does not 
form part of the state of the art.108 This concept derives from the concept of 
the man skilled in the art. This imaginary person has an average knowledge 
in the particular area of technology and an invention is seen as new if it does 
not form part of the knowledge of this imaginary person.109 If something is 
not part of the state of the art, then it is new and the novelty requirement is 
fulfilled. Moreover, the novelty requirement is absolute and global, meaning 
that everything which is or has been possible for a skilled man to find 
anywhere in the world belongs to the state of the art.110  
3.5 The scope of a patent  
The patent-holder is granted a monopoly over the product, meaning that 
others can be excluded from making, using, offering for sale, selling or 
importing that product.111 How broad the scope of the patent should be has 
been intensively debated. This thesis limits itself to make a few comments 
on the issue. The patent claims determine the extent of protection, while the 
description and drawings are used to interpret the claims.112 Hence, the 
scope of a particular patent is not determined in advance but instead, if 
infringement claims are brought against a competitor, the court will decide 
the extent of protection in that particular case. This is achieved by 
comparing the patent with the alleged infringement product.113  
 
The Supplementary Protection Certificate114 (SPC) gives the holder of a 
pharmaceutical patent the possibility to receive extended protection for a 
maximum of five years by Regulation 1768/92. A SPC confers the same 
rights upon its holder as were conferred by the basic patent, even though it 
should be noted that it is not a “new” patent.115 This additional protection is 
motivated by the long time span that elapses between the patent application 
and the time when the product can be effectively marketed. As mentioned 
earlier, extensive regulatory obligations rest upon an applicant of marketing 
authorisation, obligations which may be significantly longer than in other 
sectors.116 SPCs can be seen as a way to ensure that pharmaceutical 
companies can recoup their investment in R&D by extending the period of 
marketing exclusivity.117 According to Article 19 of the SPC Regulation, the 
possibility to receive supplementary protection is only available to products 
that were marketed after 1 January 1985. According to the same provision, 
                                                
108 EPC Article 54 (1).  
109 Domeij (2000) p. 134.  
110 Ibid, p. 132.  
111 TRIPS Article 28 (1a).  
112 EPC Article 69.  
113 Domeij (1998) p. 481.  
114 Council Regulation 1768/92/EC. The original SPC has been amended several times, 
most recently by regulation No. EC/469/2009.   
115 Regulation EC/469/2009, Article 5. 
116 Pharma Report, para 293.  
117 Gunther & Breuvart (2005) s. 669.   
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an exception is made to Denmark and Germany, where the date is replaced 
by 1 January 1998 and Belgium and Italy, where the date is replaced by 1 
January 1982.  
3.6 A short comment on patenting in the 
pharmaceutical sector  
As already outlined, patent protection is an essential component of the 
pharmaceutical sector. Since innovation of pharmaceuticals is a high-risk 
and high-cost business, and imitation on the contrary is a low-risk and low-
cost business, solid protection against imitation must be provided in order 
for innovation to exist.118 It may be argued, that if no protection were 
provided, the high cost for R&D would discourage companies from 
investing money in innovation, with the consequence that certain medicine 
would never reach the market.119 Furthermore, it is important that protection 
can be rewarded at an early stage in the process of developing a new 
pharmaceutical. Besides creating incentives for the innovator, it is argued 
that early protection may have positive effects such as reducing duplicative 
research.120 Thus, the function of a pharmaceutical patent is to provide a 
sufficient degree of protection to ensure that new drugs are being developed 
without making it too difficult for competitors to enter the market.  
 
 
 
                                                
118 Pharma Report, para 251.  
119 Hunter (2001) p. 8.  
120 Domeij (2000) p. 26.  
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4 Abuse of Dominant Position 
4.1 Introduction 
The landscape of EU competition law is constantly evolving. During the last 
decades, the boundaries of Article 102 have been widened and the number 
of confrontations between dominant companies and the enforcement 
authorities has been on the increase.121 The pharmaceutical market has not 
been the main priority for the enforcement of competition policy in the EU. 
This is bound to change, which is obvious from the recent proceedings 
against AstraZeneca and the Pharma Report.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the main features of the concept of 
abuse of dominant position, particularly in the context of IPRs, by reviewing 
the relevant legal framework and case law relating to the application of 
Article 102. In addition, the Commission’s Guidance on Article [102] 
Enforcement Priorities122 will be used as a point of reference, even though it 
is acknowledged that the Guidelines are not a statement of the law.  
4.2 General on abuse of dominant position  
To ensure a system of free competition on the market, controlling anti-
competitive behaviour is crucial.123 Article 102 liability is one of the 
stepping stones to attain this. The provision prohibits:  
 
“any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it (…) in so far 
as it may affect trade between Member States.”  
 
Article 102 gives examples of conduct that is abusive but the list is not 
exhaustive. Any practice, which fulfils the conditions of the provision, is 
considered abusive.124 The criteria to be fulfilled is that: (1) it must be an 
undertaking, (2) that undertaking must hold a dominant position on a 
relevant market, (3) the relevant market where the dominant position is held 
must be a substantial part of the internal market, (4) the position must be 
abused in a way (5) and that abuse must substantially affect trade between 
Member States. These criteria have been the subject of intense interpretation 
by the EU Courts and the meaning and scope of Article 102 is still under 
development.125  
                                                
121 Anderman (2011) p. 5.   
122 Commission Guidance on Abusive Exclusionary Conduct.  
123 O’Donoghue & Padilla (2006) p. 1.  
124 Joined Cases C-395 and 396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge and Others, para 112. 
The principle was first established by the CJEU in Case 6-72, Continental Can, para 26.  
125 Lidgard (2011) p. 199.  
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4.3 The object of Article 102 TFEU 
Before giving consideration to the development and current state of Article 
102, it is necessary to consider its object. The main purpose of competition 
law is to create a competitive climate on the market. Ensuring a system of 
free and undistorted competition on the internal market is also one of the 
primary objectives of the EU.126 The benefits of competition are many: 
lower prices, better products, wider choice and greater efficiency.127 Greater 
efficiency means getting the maximum possible output from the given input 
of resources.128 This is not only beneficial for the consumers but also for 
society that will be better off as a whole. 
4.3.1 Competition as a promoter of innovation 
Competition may also foster innovation. However, this is not self-evident 
and as earlier mentioned, the relationship between innovation and 
competition has been widely debated. In 2007, Baker published a paper in 
which he described two main approaches. One view, often associated with 
Kenneth Arrow, suggests that competition encourages innovation by 
spurring companies to find new products in order to satisfy consumer 
demand. A contrary view, often associated with Joseph Schumpeter, is that 
only dominant companies with significant market power have the financial 
strength to invest in R&D, and hence, monopoly is preferred over 
competition.129 Baker agrees with Arrow and concludes that competition law 
should be embraced as essential for fostering innovation.130 Today, the 
general view seems to be that competition fosters innovation and the 
challenge is rather to find the appropriate balance between competition 
enforcement on the one hand and incentives to innovate on the other.131   
 
Article 3 (1b) TFEU states that the “[u]nion shall have the exclusive 
competence […] in the establishing of the competition rules necessary for 
the functioning of the internal market.” Article 102 is one of those rules, 
operating as a tool to protect competition.132 But free competition is a means 
to an end and not goal in itself. What purpose is the protection of 
competition intended to serve? 
4.3.2 Protecting consumers by protecting competition 
Competition law protects consumers by protecting competition and is 
ultimately pursued to the benefit of the consumer. One indication to this is 
the wording of the competition provisions: Article 101 (3) states that the 
provision’s core objective is to protect competition to the benefit of 
                                                
126 Article 3 (1b) TFEU. 
127 Whish & Bailey (2011) p. 4.  
128 Osterud (2010) p. 29.   
129 Baker (2007) p. 575.  
130 Ibid, p. 602.  
131 See for example Communication from the Commission (2007).   
132 Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, paras 20- 21.  
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consumers.133 Also, Article 102 (b) prohibits dominant undertakings to limit 
the production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers. This view has been supported by the EU Courts. In Continental 
Can134, the CJEU concluded that competition law does not only intervene 
against practices that cause a direct damage to consumers, but also against 
practices that has a detrimental effect on consumers through their impact on 
the competitive structure of the market i.e. a indirect effect. Hence, 
competition law is concerned with conduct that has a detrimental effect on 
consumers, irrespectively of whether that effect is direct or indirect.  
 
Similarly, the Commission seems to view consumer welfare as the primary 
objective of competition law and Article 102. In the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities, the essence of protecting the competitive process is 
emphasized: “What really matters is protecting an efficient competitive 
process and not simply protecting competitors.”135 Thus, even though steps 
to prevent dominant undertakings from excluding competitors have been 
taken and thereby protecting competitors, the primary focus has been to 
protect a competitive market as such. The primary purpose with Article 102 
is consumer welfare, as outlined above, and not to protect weak competitors 
from going bankrupt.136 Whish and Bailey make a comparison with other 
competitive activities to illustrate this. The authors suggest that as in any 
competition, whether in economics, in sports, or any other kind of 
competition, the most fitted competitor will win. This is an inevitable 
consequence of the competitive process, which should not be condemned 
but rather applauded.137    
4.3.3 The wider perspective 
Competition law plays an important role in the overriding goal of achieving 
market integration in the EU.138 A unification of the internal market is of 
great significance; some have taken it so far as calling it “an obsession of 
the EU authorities.”139 The idea of an open single market is to encourage 
companies to expand their business over national borders by dismantling 
trader barriers between Member States in order to ensure the freedom of 
movement for goods, services, workers and capital.140 In order to protect the 
free movement on the internal market, clear rules that ensure free 
                                                
133 Even though Article 102 does not contain an equivalent exception to Article 101 (3), it 
has been established that Article 101 and Article 102 serve to achieve the same goal. See 
Case 6/72, Continental Can.  
134 Case 6/72, Continental Can, para 26.  
135 Commission Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities, para 6.   
136 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, para 58: “the 
primary purpose of [Article 102] is to prevent competition from distortion – and in 
particular to safeguard the interests of consumers – rather than to protect the position of 
particular competitors.”  
137 Whish & Bailey (2011) p. 175.  
138 Whish & Bailey (2012) p. 23, see also Commission Guidance on Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct, para 1.    
139 Whish & Bailey (2011) p. 24. 
140 Ibid, p. 23. 
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competition between companies needs to exist.141 Thus, Article 102 is one of 
the tools used by the Commission when competition on the internal market 
is not working properly.   
 
The object and meaning of Article 102 is constantly changing: it is an 
expression of the values and aims currently existing in society which is 
subject to change when the political agenda change.142 Keep this in mind 
when we move on to explore Article 102 and the difficulties in finding a 
universal formula for its application.  
4.4 Dominant position 
Article 102 only applies to companies in a dominant position. Therefore, 
before moving on to the assessment of the actual abuse, the existence of a 
dominant position must be established.143 Note that a dominant position is 
not in itself anti-competitive. On the contrary, a dominant company is still 
allowed to compete on the merits as any other company. Only if the 
company exploits this position, allowing its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition, does it constitute a violation of Article 102.144 The 
meaning of dominance was established by the CJEU in United Brands145 to 
be:  
 
“[...] a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.”  
 
A dominant position can be said to equal substantial market power, a 
terminology used by the Commission in its Guidance on Article [102] 
Enforcement Priorities.146 The first step is to define the market in which this 
market power is exercised.  
4.4.1 Market definition  
For the purposes of Article 102, market definition is a necessary preliminary 
step in finding an abuse because, before that abuse can be established, it 
must be demonstrated that the undertaking is holding a dominant position in 
a given market, which presupposes that the market is already defined.147 
Dominance is not related to the size of the undertaking under scrutiny: if the 
                                                
141 Korah (2007) p. 13.  
142 Whish & Bailey (2011) p. 20.  
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relevant market is defined narrowly, even small firms become dominant. As 
follows, a wider definition of the market is better from an undertaking’s 
point of view because it improves the company’s chance of falling outside 
the scope of Article 102. The EU competition authorities are prone to define 
markets narrowly, creating single products markets, thereby making it easy 
to find a position of dominance for IP holders.148 The market definition is 
divided into two separate subsections: the product market and the 
geographic market. 
 
The definition of the relevant product market is a question of 
interchangeability or substitutability. The concept was introduced by the 
CJEU in Continental Can149 where the CJEU concluded that products 
belong to the same product market if they are interchangeable from the 
consumers/buyers point of view. Two products are not substitutes if they are 
only to a limited extent interchangeable. Whether a product is 
interchangeable is dependent on the products characteristics, its price and its 
intended use.150 Companies are also subject to supply substitutability and 
potential substitutability. Supply substitutability can be considered in special 
circumstances, for example if switching production to the relevant product 
does not incur significant additional costs or risks for the potential 
competing supplier.151 Although potential competition is a competitive 
constraint, it is not considered when defining the relevant market but at the 
subsequent step: appraisal of dominance.152  
 
When the product market has been established, the assessment continues to 
the geographic market. The relevant geographic market is a clearly defined 
area in which a product is marketed and the conditions of competition are 
sufficiently homogenous for the effect of the economic power of the 
undertaking concerned to be able to be evaluated.153 When the relevant 
geographic market is determined, an evaluation into whether that market 
constitutes a substantial part of the internal market must be done. As of 
today, this prerequisite is usually met since it has been interpreted that a 
substantial part of the internal market can be a single Member States, or 
even just a part of that Member State.154 
4.4.2 Appraisal of dominance 
Having defined the relevant market, the analysis turns to whether the 
company is dominant on that market or not. First, constraints imposed by 
actual competitors are taken into account. Second, constraints imposed by 
potential competitors are considered. Last, constraints imposed by 
consumers (countervailing buyer power) are observed. These are the main 
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factors that are used when examining the competitive structure of the 
market.155            
 
The market share of the company is an indicator of constraints imposed by 
actual competitors. A large market share implies dominance; a small market 
share implies the opposite.156 Only a very high or a very low market share 
can establish dominance. Clearly, monopoly amounts to a dominant 
position. A market share around 60-70 % is a clear proof of dominance.157 A 
market share of 50 % or more constitutes a presumption for dominance.158 
More difficult to examine are market shares of around 25-60 %.159 But 
market share alone cannot be determinative since they are only indicators 
and give no information about potential competition or buyer power, why 
other factors, as those described above, is taken into account. Let us look 
into the pharmaceutical market to see how this assessment can be done.  
4.4.3 Dominant position in the pharmaceutical sector 
Given the specific characteristics of the pharmaceutical sector, one could 
argue that special considerations should be taken when defining the relevant 
market. First, let us briefly repeat which those differences are. As pointed 
out in chapter two, governments usually regulate the price for prescription 
drugs, thereby setting the usual price mechanism out of play.160 In the dual 
pricing policy case GlaxoSmithKline161, the CJEU acknowledged that 
although the pharmaceutical sector is subject to the same competition rules 
as other sectors, the specific nature of the sector should be taken into 
account when making assessments under competition law. Furthermore, the 
Court stated that the sector to a significant extent is shielded from the free 
play of supply and demand, which may impact on the assessment.162  
 
Another characteristic of the sector is that the demand-side is less price-
sensitive than in other sectors, also described in chapter two, because it is 
the doctor who prescribes the medicine, but the consumer or health care 
system who pays for it.163 From this, it is clear that the assessment has to be 
less focused on price and demand elasticity and more focused on factors 
specific to the sector.164  
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The CJEU made a narrow market definition in AstraZeneca.165 
AstraZeneca’s product Losec, a proton pump inhibitor (PPI) treating ulcers, 
was defined as a single product market, inevitably leading to dominance on 
that market for AstraZeneca. The defendant argued that PPIs should be part 
of the same product market as H2 blockers because the two products were 
substitutable. But the argument that H2 blockers put a competitive 
constraint on PPIs which, according to AstraZeneca’s defence, is proved by 
the gradual nature of the increase of sales of PPIs, was rejected. Instead, the 
CJEU found that the PPI had replaced H2 blockers and had its own market.  
 
According to Westin, too narrow market definitions, especially when it 
comes to innovative sectors may be counterproductive and stifle innovation. 
Westin suggests an alternative approach. According to his proposal, the 
medicine’s therapeutic indication could be a starting point. From there, the 
relevant market can be further defined according to other factors such as the 
product’s intended medical use.166 Westin is backed up by Batchelor and 
Healy, who also express concerns about a narrow market definition in the 
pharmaceutical sector. The authors suggest that external factors as the 
regulatory environment, the ability of competitors to enter the market and 
the competitive role played by existing therapies should be taken into 
account when defining the market.167  
4.5 Abuse of dominant position  
When a dominant position has been established, the analysis turns to the 
assessment of whether that position has been abused. How can we 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate behaviour? A risk associated with 
applying Article 102 too aggressively, and especially in relation to 
exclusionary conduct, is that competition is chilled rather than encouraged. 
Such a result would obviously be counterproductive: a law designed to 
promote competition should not have the effect of diminishing it.168 
Therefore, a careful application of Article 102 is called upon.   
 
Article 102 (b) states that conduct consisting of “limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers” is an 
abuse. This is the more traditional sort of exclusionary abuse. But more 
subtle, non-price strategies aimed at excluding competitors may also be 
abusive, e.g. patent litigation, use and abuse of regulatory procedures and 
launch of second generation products.169 Furthermore, since Article 102 
does not provide a definition of “abuse”, the meaning and scope has been 
developed through case law. 
                                                
165 Case 457/10, AstraZeneca, para 36-52.  
166 Westin I (2011) p. 58.  
167 Batchelor & Healy (2013) p. 171.  
168 Whish & Bailey (2011) p. 193.  
169 O’Donoghue & Padilla (2006) p. 519.  
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4.5.1 Developments of Article 102 in case law 
The concept of exclusionary abuse has been defined in numerous cases by 
the EU Courts. In Michelin I,170 the CJEU concluded that a dominant 
company has a special responsibility, meaning that a dominant company 
must not allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
internal market.171 This responsibility applies irrespective of the reasons to 
why the company has a dominant position. The scope of the special 
responsibility shall be considered in the light of the specific circumstances 
in each case which has been confirmed by the EU Courts several times, 
most recently in AstraZeneca.172  
 
In Continental Can173, the CJEU clarified that Article 102 aims at practices 
that may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to practices that are 
detrimental to consumers through their impact on the effective competitive 
structure. Thus, finding a directly negative impact on consumers is not 
necessary to find an infringement of Article 102, rather it is enough that the 
competitive structure is affected. 
 
Hoffman-La Roche174 dealt with the scope of the special responsibility. In 
the case, the CJEU defined abusive conduct as methods different from those 
governing normal competition, methods that have the effect of hindering the 
maintenance of the existing degree of competition on the market, or the 
growth of that competition.175 Furthermore, the CJEU repeated its statement 
from Continental Can, arguing that:  
 
“Article 102 covers not only abuse which may directly prejudice 
consumers but also abuse which indirectly prejudices them by 
impairing the effective competitive structure as envisaged by 
(former) Article 3 (1) (g) of the Treaty.”176  
 
But what is normal competition? The Court dealt with the issue in AKZO177, 
repeating its formulation from Hoffman-La Roche, but adding that a 
dominant company is prohibited to eliminate a competitor, and thereby 
strengthen its own position, by using means other than those that come 
within the scope of competition on the merits.178 Thus, as long as the 
behaviour of a dominant firm is seen as competition on the merits, the 
behaviours lawfulness cannot be questioned from a competition law 
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perspective. Hence, the issue to discuss is the scope of competition on the 
merits. One may feel that the formulation is rather vague and gives no clear 
guidance on how to identify such conduct. But competition on the merits is 
a general definition which needs to be broad in order to catch a variety of 
conduct.179 
 
Abuse of dominance is an objective concept. Therefore, an intention to 
exclude or weaken competition is not necessary for an abuse to be 
established and the conduct of a dominant company may be regarded as 
abusive in the absence of any intention to do harm. This has been 
emphasized by the EU Courts several times180, while at the same time, in 
some rare cases, holding conduct as abusive only if it is part of a plan to 
hamper competition and eliminate competitors.181  
 
It should also be added that in relation to IPRs, CICRA v Renault established 
that even though the mere possession of an exclusive right does not 
constitute an abuse, the exercise of that right may yet be prohibited under 
Article 102.182 Therefore, the challenge is to decide at what point, if at all, 
the exercise of an IPR is abusive.    
4.5.2 Objective justification  
Once an abuse has been established, dominant companies may put forward 
arguments and evidence that justifies their conduct, thereby escaping the 
prohibition in Article 102. Østerud concludes that the concept of objective 
justification has been applied to conduct that furthers a legitimate purpose 
and is proportionate.183 A valid justification can be economic justifications 
other than the elimination of a competitor, a formula that was used by the 
CJEU in France Télécom SA.184  
 
The “objective justification principle” has been developed in case law since 
Article 102 lacks an equivalent to the exemption provision in Article 101 (3) 
TFEU.185 The Commission has the burden of proof for the abuse and in a 
way, also for the objective justification. Even though it is the undertaking 
that is responsible to put forward evidence and arguments in support of its 
claim, in the end, it is the Commission who has the burden of proof to show 
the absence of such an objective justification.186 The assessment under 
Article 102 should not be divided into two parts, one dealing with whether 
an abuse exists, and one following where the undertaking defends the abuse 
by showing objective justifications to the conduct. Rather, the objective 
                                                
179 Østerud (2010) p. 38. 
180 Case 85/76, Hoffman La Roche, para 91, see also C-82/01P Aéroports de Paris.   
181 Case C-62/86, AKZO para 63 et seq.   
182 Case 53/87, CICRA v Renault, para 18.  
183 Østerud (2010) p. 249.  
184 Case C-202/07P, France Télécom SA.  
185 Østerud (2010) p. 245.  
186 Anderman (2011) p. 24. 
 35 
justification is an integral part of the assessment of abuse and only if there is 
an absence of objective justifications may an abuse be established.187 
 
Irish Sugar188 deals with an abuse of dominance on the retail sugar market, 
where the appellant, Irish Sugar plc, put forward its financial difficulties as 
an objective justification defence to its anti-competitive behaviour. The 
CJEU rejected Irish Sugar’s defence, concluding that even though a 
dominant company has the freedom to protect their commercial interests, 
that conduct must, in order to be lawful, be based upon a criteria of 
economic efficiency and be consistent with the interests of consumers.189 
The CJEU also rejected the objective justification defence put forward in 
Microsoft.190 According to Microsoft’s argument, their refusal to supply was 
justified by objective considerations since the technology concerned was 
protected by an IPR which was secret and valuable and contained important 
innovations.191  
 
The Commission touches upon the concept of objective justification in a 
Guidance paper were such claims are referred to as “objective necessity and 
efficiencies.”192 According to the Guidelines, an objective necessity must be 
based on factors external to the company itself and mentions health and 
safety reasons as two such factors. Although opening up for a more flexible 
application of abuse of dominant position, the approval of objective 
justifications have been limited by the Commission and the EU Courts.193  
4.5.3 A more effects-based approach? 
Whether the EU authorities have a per se approach or an effects-based 
approach to Article 102 has been under discussion. It has already been said 
that the Commission and the EU Courts have received some criticism 
against their application of Article 102. In particular, these comments have 
accused them for taking a too formalistic approach, considering some forms 
of abuses as prohibited per se. For example, in Michelin II194, the Court 
seemed to consider all royalty-inducing discounts as an abuse irrespectively 
of whether it has an actual anti-competitive effect or not. Thus, in this case, 
no anti-competitive effect was necessary for an abuse to be established.195  
 
Is this the general rule? Most would argue the opposite. For example, Whish 
and Bailey come to the conclusion that a trend against a more effects-based 
approach is clearly established.196 According to them, for an abuse to exist 
under Article 102, it must be shown that the conduct has anti-competitive 
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effects. Even though accepting that the EU Courts have tolerated per se 
rules under Article 102, for example in the above mentioned Michelin II, the 
authors conclude that the current state of Article 102 does require that an 
effect on the market has been showed.197 They support their position with 
case law as well as the Commission’s Guidelines. In TeliaSonera198, for 
example, the potential anti-competitive effects had to be demonstrated 
before the conduct (margin squeeze) was condemned unlawful.199 
 
Then, is it always necessary to show an anti-competitive effect for Article 
102 to be applicable? In its Guidance paper, the Commission states that they 
will normally intervene if an alleged abuse is likely to lead to anti-
competitive foreclosure, on the basis of cogent and convincing arguments.200 
A number of relevant factors are then enumerated which should be taken 
into account as well as the more specific factors that are set out later in the 
Guidance paper. Without going to deep into these factors, it can be 
concluded that the position of the Commission is that an assessment of 
abuse must take into account whether that conduct has anti-competitive 
effects or not. The legal position is obviously unclear, even though the 
above reasoning indicates that the Commission will require a potential or 
actual effect when enforcing Article 102.  
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5 Evergreening of Patents in the EU 
5.1 Introduction 
Evergreening is a new form of abuse that may fall within the scope of 
Article 102. The concept of evergreening was briefly presented in the 
second chapter of this thesis. In this chapter, we will take a closer look on its 
meaning and the application of Article 102 to such conduct. As a 
preliminary step to finding an abuse, a dominant position must be 
established. The present chapter assumes that such a position has been 
established and merely focuses on the assessment of abuse.   
 
Initially, this chapter gives a general review of the concept of evergreening. 
The relation between such conduct and Article 102 will then be discussed, 
whereupon a case study of the recently decided AstraZeneca will be 
presented. Thereafter, three evergreening practices will be reviewed with 
focus on one of them, namely the launch of second generation products.  
5.2 General on evergreening  
Evergreening contains a multitude of strategies adopted by patent holders 
with the purpose to extend the privileged position they hold during 
exclusivity. Evergreening is not a formal legal concept but rather refers to 
numerous lawful or unlawful methods by which pharmaceutical companies 
aim to extend their patent rights. These methods can form a part of a 
company’s strategy to become more competitive by limiting competition 
from generics or enhancing their bargaining position against other 
patentees.201    
  
In the Pharma Report, the Commission identified several practices as 
potentially anti-competitive but without giving any guidance as to their legal 
significance. But just as the Commission itself points out, neither was it the 
purpose of the report.202 Instead, the report provides a context and factual 
basis for dealing with potentially anti-competitive conduct. Note that the 
Commission does not explicitly use the term evergreening but refers to such 
conduct as “instruments of a tool-box, which is used to delay or prevent 
generic entry.”203 Examples of such practices are patent filing strategies204, 
patent related litigation,205 patent settlements206 and life cycle strategies.207 
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The Report also provides a discussion on the effects of a using the strategies 
described cumulatively with a view to prolonging the life cycle of a 
pharmaceutical.208 Furthermore, (mis) use of the regulatory framework has 
been seen as anti-competitive in AstraZeneca.209 
 
An example of a definition of evergreening can be found in the Pharma 
Report, done by the European Consumer Association. Even though it may 
be influenced by the association’s policy objectives, it is useful to 
understand the concept of evergreening. They define evergreening as:  
 
”[...] a specific tactic used by originators to extend patents by 
seeking to obtain as many patents as possible during the 
development of the product and the marketing phase, and to 
obtain a patent extension for new manufacturing processes, new 
coating and new uses of established products. […] Originators 
can also slightly change an active ingredient and present an old 
medicine as a new product and register a new patent.”210    
 
Why do pharmaceutical companies’ evergreen their patents? When the 
exclusive period of protection ends, a pharmaceutical will most likely be 
exposed to rigorous competition from generic products.211 To deal with this 
potential decline in revenue streams, the originator companies use different 
countermeasures to deal with the competition from generic companies. One 
of these tactics is evergreening. The object behind evergreening is to extend 
the privileged position that the patentee holds during the period of 
protection for the base patent.212 In the Pharma Report, an originator 
company suggested that “[evergreening] represents the most effective 
strategic initiative to counter generic [versions of the first generation 
product]”.213  
 
Hence, evergreening may involve different kinds of conduct with a 
potentially anti-competitive object and/or effect. However, there has been 
some criticism against the use of the term evergreening. For example, the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations  
(EFPIA) is stating on their website that the concept of incremental 
innovation and evergreening is used in pejorative way. According to the 
EFPIA, evergreening implies that patenting of second generation products is 
seen as anti-competitive or as an inappropriate extension of exclusivity.214 It 
is obvious that evergreening can be defined in various ways, and lead to 
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both positive and negative results. The thesis now turns to the application of 
Article 102 to such practices.  
5.3 Article 102 and evergreening  
Lately, new forms of abuse have been identified under Article 102. One of 
them is evergreening. Even though a notable amount of doctrine has been 
published on the concept of abuse of dominant position, the meaning and 
scope of Article 102 in relation to evergreening is uncertain. The application 
raise several questions and the result of such an assessment must most 
certainly balance at the border between lawful use and unlawful abuse. The 
assessment, as any assessment under Article 102, therefore requires a 
careful weighing of the conduct's object and effects as well as a 
consideration of the specific circumstances in each case. Evergreening does 
not fit under any of the enumerated examples in Article 102. But as outlined 
above, this list is not exhaustive and any behaviour that fulfils the criteria in 
Article 102 may be unlawful.215 Therefore, as long as the particular 
evergreening practice fulfils the criteria of Article 102, it can also be 
forbidden. 
 
Most pharmaceutical originator companies possess or have possessed patent 
protection to their pharmaceuticals. Patents, as all IPRs, are national rights, 
granted and enforced by national law. Therefore, community law cannot 
challenge the lawfulness of the right: Article 345 TFEU hinders that.216 The 
defence from patentees when alleged of an abuse of Article 102 is that the 
patent right is just a lawful exercise of a right granted by law. EPO supports 
this view in a comment on the Pharma Report.217 Although agreeing that 
some of the defensive patent strategies addressed in the report may not be in 
line with the policy objectives of the patent system, EPO suggests that the 
exercise of patent rights, including post-grant, should be lawful as long as 
the conduct remains in line with prevailing rules of competition law.218 A 
company’s efforts to make the most out of their by law granted patent right 
must at face be seen as a legitimate way of competing on the merits, even 
though, as pointed out before, patent laws are not immune against 
competition law.   
 
Another aspect of the application of Article 102 to evergreening is that 
pharmaceutical product markets have been narrowly defined, for example in 
AstraZeneca219, making it easier to become dominant. A patent gives the 
patentee an exclusive right to exploit the product which often, even though 
not always, leads to a monopoly on the market. At this point in the 
presentation, we know that the mere possession of a patent right does not 
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automatically constitute a dominant position, although inescapably indicates 
a very strong position on the market. With the pharmaceutical market being 
highly innovative and characterised by these exclusive rights, almost all 
companies may be seen as dominant if the courts continue to define product 
markets narrowly.220  
 
Also, classical abuses take place on the market. On the contrary, 
evergreening does not. Instead, evergreening usually takes place in a 
regulatory context which has an effect on the market.221 As been described, 
the effect of evergreening may be to exclude or delay generic competition 
(an exclusionary abuse) but instead of creating economic barriers to market 
entry, as most of the classical abuses do, evergreening creates legal 
barriers.222 Thus, the exclusion of competitors is not a result of a pricing 
policy or any other exclusive practice, but merely the use of regulatory 
framework. Still, the effect of the conduct will take place on the market, just 
as the classical abuses. This should not cause any problem when applying 
Article 102 to evergreening. Article 102 prohibits any conduct that has an 
effect on the market. It is settled case law that the abusive conduct can take 
place in market different from the one where the effects are caused.223 It 
follows that the conduct can take place outside the market but still be 
abusive, as long as the conduct has effects on the market.224  
 
Furthermore, the new abuses are most commonly based upon the existence 
of an intention to distort competition. But as mentioned above, abuse of 
dominant position under EU law is an objective concept why the application 
of Article 102 is independent of whether the pharmaceutical company has 
acted with the intention to delay or prevent generic entry or not. 
Consequently, even though intent may be common, it should not be a 
necessary condition for an abuse to exist. An intention to distort competition 
must be supplemented by some kind of objective behaviour that is seen as 
abusive. There are some good arguments for not relying on intent. Firstly, 
all companies seek to eliminate competitors in some way: that is what 
competition is about. Second, competition law is more about consumer 
welfare and less about catching the bad guys. Therefore, effect without 
intent should be unlawful while intent without effect should be lawful. 
Lastly, it is difficult to show intent by a company which leads to uncertainty 
and subjective evaluations.225    
5.4 A case study - AstraZeneca  
In December 2012, the CJEU delivered its decision in AstraZeneca.226 The 
case has received a considerable amount of attention due to a couple of 
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reasons. The case was the first in which the CJEU ruled upon an abuse of 
dominance in the pharmaceutical sector in relation to evergreening. 
Moreover, AstraZeneca is one of few cases where the strategic use of the 
patent system has been considered an abuse.227 Therefore, the findings by 
the Court are highly relevant to the possible outcome of this thesis.  
 
The judgment was based upon the Commission’s decision from 2005, first 
upheld by the General Court228 (GC) and accordingly reconfirmed by the 
CJEU. In all instances, AstraZeneca was found guilty of abusing its 
dominant position on two grounds:  
 
(1) Making misleading statements to patent offices and courts in several 
Member States to obtain an extension of patent protection through a 
SPC for its original Losec.   
(2) Operating a strategy to minimize the impact of Losec going off 
patent by withdrawing its marketing authorisation for the original 
Losec in Denmark, Sweden and Denmark when launching Losec 
MUPS in those Member States.    
 
One might add that Losec was AstraZeneca’s bestseller, having annual sales 
reaching around €6 billion towards the end of the 1990s, making it one of 
the most successful products in the pharmaceutical history and obviously of 
great importance for AstraZeneca.229  
 
The first abuse consisted in the misleading statements made to patent offices 
and courts in order to obtain a SPC. AstraZeneca argued that the GC took a 
“legally flawed approach to competition on the merits.”230 According to 
AstraZeneca’s arguments concerning the first abuse, deliberate fraud or 
deceit should be a requirement to find an abuse of regulatory frameworks. 
To their defence, AstraZeneca claimed that they made an alternative 
interpretation of the SPC regulation, thus not misleading patent offices but 
instead, acted in good faith. A too strict application of Article 102 would, 
according to the argumentation by AstraZeneca, impede and delay the 
applications for patents, which in turn would have a bad impact on 
competition.231 
 
In relation to the first abuse, the CJEU found that AstraZeneca’s consistent 
and linear conduct, characterized by highly misleading representations and a 
manifest lack of transparency, falls outside the scope of competition on the 
merits.232 The CJEU also made it clear that it cannot be inferred from the 
GC’s reasoning, contrary to the opinion of AstraZeneca, that any patent 
application which is rejected on the grounds that it does not fulfil the 
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patentability requirements, automatically infringes Article 102.233 
Furthermore, the CJEU made clear that potential anti-competitive effects 
are enough for a conduct to fall under the prohibition in Article 102. First, 
the Court emphasized that an abuse cannot be established in absence of 
current and certain anti-competitive effects on the market. However, such an 
effect does not necessarily have to be concrete and it is enough to show that 
the effect is potential.234 To require deliberate fraud or deceit for Article 102 
to be applicable is a misinterpretation of the law: Article 102 is an objective 
concept and good faith is irrelevant.235  
 
The second abuse consisted of deregistration of marketing authorisations in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden for the first generation medicine Losec, at 
the same time as the second generation medicine Losec MUPS was 
launched in those Member States. At the time, for a generic product to enjoy 
the benefit of an abridged procedure, a reference marketing authorisation 
had to exist in the Member State where the application was filed. Hence, the 
withdrawal of the marketing authorisation for Losec made it more costly 
and time-consuming for generic companies to launch generic versions of 
Losec.236 AstraZeneca argued that the exercise by a legitimate right cannot 
constitute an abuse in the relevant case since the right to withdraw a 
marketing authorisation cannot be prohibited, and at the same time 
forbidden, by the EU.237 Furthermore, AstraZeneca made an analogy with 
compulsory licensing cases, arguing that the withdrawal of an SPC can only 
be abusive in exceptional circumstances where there is an elimination of all 
effective competition. In the present case, the deregistration only rendered 
competition more difficult and according to AstraZeneca, it was not shown 
that it had a disproportionate effect on competition, which is necessary 
under the concept of compulsory licensing.238     
 
First, the Court emphasized that a strategy may be legitimate even if it has 
the object to deal with generic competition and minimize the erosion of 
sales. Only when the conduct departs from practices coming within the 
scope of competition on the merits, which are detriment to consumers, will 
it be seen as an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 
102.239 Then, the Court concluded that the illegality of abusive behaviour 
under Article 102 is unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with 
other legal rules.240 In the present case, the conduct was designed to, inter 
alia, prevent generic competition, and not in any way based on the 
legitimate protection of an investment, which was within the scope of 
competition on the merits. The absence of grounds relating to the defence of 
a legitimate interest of an undertaking engaged in competition on the merits 
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makes that conduct unlawful under Article 102.241 Thus, since it was the 
lack of an objective justification that made the conduct abusive, the 
existence of an objective justification would have turned the conduct lawful, 
even if it had the effect of preventing generic competition. The CJEU 
pointed out that the central element of the abuse was withdrawal of the 
marketing authorisation for the original Losec. AstraZeneca claimed that the 
GC exceeded its jurisdiction when defining the second abuse as a 
combination of the launch of Losec MUPS and the deregistration of Losec. 
The CJEU argued against this by claiming that AstraZeneca made a 
misinterpretation of the judgment by the GC. Instead, as the CJEU points 
out, it was the deregistration alone which produced the anti-competitive 
effects.242 Lastly, the CJEU rejects the “compulsory license argument” 
stating that the present situation is in no way comparable to such a situation, 
most importantly because the deregistration of an marketing authorisation in 
no way compares to the possession of an IPR.243    
 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the GC’s 
judgment, while comments on the findings in the CJEU have been 
limited.244 Batchelor and Healy provide a short comment on the CJEU’s 
findings in an article from 2013.245 In their analysis, the authors come to the 
conclusion that a simple mistake in the communication with a patent office 
is probably not enough for an infringement of Article 102 to be established, 
while large scale intentional misleading falls within the prohibition.246 In 
relation to the second abuse, the authors conclude that the judgment may not 
be as far reaching as the first abuse since the Court leaves the door open for 
legitimate reasons or objective justifications for the regulatory conduct 
which could exempt the undertaking from Article 102 liability. Potentially, 
one such act could be to avoid pharmacoviligance, which the Court seemed 
to be ready to accept.247 Furthermore, the authors disapprove the CJEU 
judgment in that it does not give any clear guidelines as to when a conduct 
is abusive, but rather just not confirms the strict test set up by the General 
Court.248  
 
To some extent, comments made in relation to the GC’s judgment may be 
useful. For example, Westin published a paper in 2009 in which the strict 
legal test for abuse in AstraZeneca was criticized.249 Lidgard is also critical 
to the judgment by the GC.250 He argues that a too strict enforcement of the 
competition rules will have negative consequences for the pharmaceutical 
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sector. Originator companies, e.g. AstraZeneca, have been forced to make 
cuts in their budgets and as a consequence, research centers in Lund and 
Great Britain have been shut down. Clearly, this has a direct effect on future 
innovation. Contrary to the opinion of the Commission, Lidgard argues that 
generic competition is not beneficial for competition if it is promoted to the 
expense of originators.251 Moreover, Lidgard questions the conclusion made 
by the GC in relation to under which circumstances a misleading statement 
to a patent office is seen as abusive. According to Lidgard, it is not an 
accurate balance between the interests of originators and generic companies 
if every incorrect statement made to the patent office is seen as abusive. It is 
the patent offices which has the competence to do such assessments and not 
the Courts, and if it turns out that the patent office have made a mistake, the 
remedy can be found in civil litigation. Lastly, Lidgard comes to the 
conclusion that the Court is taking liberties when using competition law as a 
remedy and complement to other legal rules. Lidgard questions whether this 
is in compliance with the policy objective to promote innovation in the 
EU.252 Moreover, Murphy published a paper where he commented on the 
2005 decision by the Commission.253 In the paper, he expresses strong 
concerns about the decision. Murphy points out that the Commission’s 
approach is radical and introduces a form of compulsory licensing through 
the back door since pharmaceutical companies are under the obligation to 
actively maintain rights i.e. marketing authorisations. According to the 
author, this extension of the special responsibility goes way beyond existing 
case law.254      
5.5 A selection evergreening strategies 
5.5.1 Patent litigation  
Normally, litigation brought by or against a patent holder is perfectly 
legitimate and part of the fundamental right to justice.255 Nonetheless, legal 
proceedings may have a chilling effect on competition and is therefore, 
under certain circumstances, within the scope of Article 102. Such patent 
litigation is usually referred to as vexatious litigation.256 Vexatious litigation 
occurs when a party brings legal action against its adversary with an anti-
competitive intent. It may also be described as an abuse of the justice 
system. Under exceptional circumstances, vexatious litigation may 
constitute an abuse of dominant position under Article 102.257  
 
Patent litigation is discussed in the Pharma Report.258 In the report, the 
Commission observes that legal proceedings, carried out by an originator 
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company, may be an effective barrier to entry for generic companies. 
Between 2000 and 2007, 54 % of all litigation (698 in total) was initiated by 
an originator company. 46 % was initiated by a generic company.259 The 
report identifies this as a evidence that litigation might be used by originator 
companies as a way of protecting their patent rights when they become 
aware of the planned entry of a generic competitor.260 The report deals with 
another aspect of vexatious litigation. It may not be necessary, for generic 
entry to be delayed or prevented, that legal proceedings are actually 
initiated. If there has been a contact between an originator company and a 
generic company, the generic company may be threatened by costly legal 
proceedings, why the risk of grant of interim measures and eventually 
damages may be enough. As a consequence, the generic company may be 
deterred from entering the market.261  
 
ITT Promedia262 deals with anti-competitive litigation. According to the 
judgment, two cumulative conditions must be established in order to 
identify situations in which litigation amounts to an abuse. First, it is 
necessary that the action cannot reasonably be considered as an attempt to 
establish the rights of the undertaking concerned and therefore only serves 
to harass the opposite party. Second, the action must be a part of a plan with 
the aim to eliminate competition.263 Both criteria must be fulfilled to 
establish an abuse.264 When making this assessment, the intention of the 
action is decisive. Only if the action is intended to enforce what the 
company, at the moment, could reasonably consider its right, will the 
conduct be seen as anti-competitive.265 However, it is only in wholly 
exceptional circumstances that litigation can be seen as an abuse of 
dominant position, motivated by the fact that it is a key component of the 
right to access to justice.266  
 
In AstraZeneca, the CJEU entirely left out a discussion on whether 
AstraZeneca had adopted anti-competitive litigation strategies, even though 
AstraZeneca initiated legal proceedings against several generic companies 
on false grounds. Lidgard draws attention to this in an article from 2010, 
concluding that it would have been interesting if the CJEU had made an 
assessment of whether this kind of litigation was within the scope of Article 
102. According to Lidgard, if a company takes advantage of a patent which 
they have obtained on false grounds, then it should be seen as unlawful 
under Article 102, while a fraud of the patent office when obtaining the 
patent should lead to an invalidation of the patent.267    
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5.5.2 Patent clusters 
A patent cluster can be described as a strategy where a multitude of patent 
applications are filed, relating to the same product but different features of 
it, with the result of creating several layers of defence against 
competition.268 Such strategies can also be referred to as patent thickets.269  
 
In the Pharma Report, patent clusters are intermingled with divisional 
patents under the headline “patent strategies”. Patent strategies include 
strategies on the timing and the scope of filing the application as well as the 
manners in which patents are applied for.270 The report suggests that patent 
strategies, and thereby patent clusters, are used to delay or prevent generic 
entry in order to secure future profits. According to the Pharma Report, as 
many as 36 of 43 of the originators asked, use patenting strategies as a 
general policy.271 The purpose is to keep generic competition off the market, 
an argument supported by remarks by originators in the report.272 There has 
been some criticism against the Commission’s approach to patent clusters in 
the Report. For example, Batchelor argues that regulating patent portfolios 
through competition law is “fraught with dangers.” To Batchelor, 
competition law should not second-guess the assessment made by a 
competent patent office since it is impossible, especially for the judiciary, to 
decide when an undertaking has too many or too weak patents.273  
 
The Commission opened proceedings against the German pharmaceutical 
company Boehringer Ingelheim in 2007 for alleged misuse of the patent 
system with the consequence of excluding potential competitors.274  The 
proceedings were closed when Boehringer settled with Almirall in 2011275, 
why it is unclear how the Commission or the EU Courts would have 
examined the situation.  
5.5.3 Second generation products and switching 
strategies   
The launch of a second generation product may be a scenario in which a 
company tries to evergreen a patent. By replacing a product close to patent 
expiry with a newly patented product, essentially based on the first product 
but improved or changed in some way, the company seeks to extend the 
privileged position that they enjoy during exclusivity with another 20 years. 
Obviously, the patent holder has done some hard work: in order to receive 
patent protection the product needs to fulfil the patentability requirements, 
but the improvements may be marginal.  
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In order to avoid exposure to competition stemming from generic versions 
of the first generation product, the second generation product is launched 
together with intensive efforts to switch a substantial part of the patients to 
the new medicine.276 By doing so, the originator will make it more difficult 
for generic companies to access the market. If the introduction of the second 
generation medicine is combined with other measures, for example 
marketing and promotion efforts, the situation for generic companies may 
become even more distressing.277 Is this course of conduct just a legitimate 
way for originator companies to compete on the merits, or does it constitute 
a breach of Article 102?  
 
There are well-founded arguments in support of not intervening against the 
launch of second generation products. Incremental innovation is further 
innovation of an existing product which is the way in which second 
generation products are invented. Such innovation may lead to significant 
improvements of the original product. As an example, new therapeutic 
indications may be discovered. Also, improvements may be done within the 
same therapeutic indication and expand the number of medicines within that 
therapeutic class.278 Other advantages may involve an increased number of 
available dosage options and the discovery of new psychological 
interactions.279 It is clear that incremental innovation may have pro-
competitive consequences since innovation is good for competition, and one 
of the primary objects of competition law is to increase innovation. Hence, 
the innovation as such is fully legitimate and part of the normal competitive 
process as long as it does not depart from behaviour that constitutes 
competition on the merits.280 It is not the incremental innovation itself that 
give rise to competition concerns but rather the combination with other 
activities to facilitate the switch, e.g. the withdrawal of marketing 
authorisations of the first generation product, marketing and promotion 
efforts or litigation. These measures may be unlawful steps in curbing 
generic competition which will be discussed in the following sections.  
5.5.3.1 The Commission’s approach to second generation 
products 
In the Commission’s Pharma Report, the launch of second generation 
products was identified as an instrument for originators to deal with generic 
competition.281 This may render the market entry of generic versions more 
difficult since most patients are switched to the second generation product 
for which generic substitution is not allowed.282 If successful, the switch will 
considerably decrease the risk of generic companies gaining a significant 
                                                
276 Westin II (2011) p. 597.  
277 Domeij (2013) p. 129.  
278 Pharma Report, para 987.  
279 IFPMA website, retrieved 2013-05-16.  
280 Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca, para 129.  
281 Pharma Report, paras 987-1049.  
282 Ibid, para 989.  
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share of the market while allowing the originator to maintain comparable 
sales numbers and avoid a cut in price.283   
 
In its Report, the Commission found that in relation to 40 % of the products 
that lost patent protection, originator companies tried to switch patients to a 
second generation product. Preferably, the launch took place before the loss 
of exclusivity in order to facilitate the switch: on an average one year and 
five months before patent expiry of the original product.284 The reason for 
facilitating this pre patent-expiry switch is that once generic versions are on 
the market, switching patients will become more difficult.285  
5.5.3.2 Switching strategies  
A switching strategy is a strategy in which an originator company, by using 
different measures, switch patients from a product facing patent expiry (the 
first generation product) to a new, recently patented product (the second 
generation product).286 This may be a scenario where a company finds it 
difficult to switch patients from a first to a second generation product. The 
switch can then be supported by substantial market efforts to change the 
prescribing habits of doctors.287 Domeij argues that there may be situations 
when switching strategies are anti-competitive and within the scope of 
Article 102.288  
5.5.3.3 The significance of the withdrawal of a marketing 
authorisation 
Is there a duty to keep a first generation product on the market, and by doing 
so also keeping the marketing authorisation, when launching a second 
generation product? In the case of AstraZeneca289, the CJEU found 
AstraZeneca guilty of abusing its dominant position by withdrawing its 
marketing authorisations in some markets for Losec when Losec MUPS was 
launched. AstraZeneca argued that they had no commercial interest in 
selling original Losec and therefore had an objective justification for 
withdrawing its marketing authorisation. AstraZeneca emphasized that the 
existence of a marketing authorisation imposes stringent pharmacovigilance 
obligations on its holder, and that maintaining such duties would stretch too 
far from the special responsibility of companies in a dominant position. By 
arguing this, AstraZeneca challenged the interpretation made by the GC of 
the concept of competition on the merits.290   
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286 Domeij (2013) p. 129.  
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After a revision of directive 2001/83/EC, a generic version is no longer 
dependent on an existing marketing authorisation because the reference can 
be made to a product which is or has been authorised.291  
5.5.3.4 Significance of promotion and marketing activities  
How far can a patent holder go when it comes to marketing activities? In 
order to switch consumers from a first generation to a second generation 
product, extensive marketing and promotion efforts are necessary.292 The 
Pharma Report discusses the significance of marketing and promotion of a 
second generation product. It is suggested that the purpose with such 
measures is to show the advantages of the second generation product and 
thereby facilitate a switch of the doctor’s prescription behaviour to the new 
product.293 These efforts are mainly directed towards doctors since it is them 
who prescribe the medicine i.e. detailing. Furthermore, originators reported 
a decrease in marketing costs for the products that were about to lose 
exclusivity. Instead, marketing costs are invested in the originator’s second 
generation product. Interesting to note is that the switch often took place in 
the year before loss of exclusivity of the original product.294 This shows how 
marketing activities are intentionally used to encourage a switch from the 
second generation medicine, moving doctors away from prescribing the 
original medicine. This may have the consequence of less generic medicine 
being sold.   
 
Another questionable marketing strategy is negative marketing of the first 
generation product before patent expiry. This may have the same 
consequences as the above mentioned scenario.295 In reality, such negative 
comparisons are actually directed against generic competitors that are about 
to enter the market. Since it is the first generation product that a generic 
potentially will be substituted for, non or negative marketing of the original 
product will actually affect the generic product.296  
 
Furthermore, Domeij highlights a rather sad consequence of switching 
strategies. Pharmaceutical companies are tempted to put their R&D efforts 
towards incremental innovation based on their existing products, instead of 
putting their money into more ground-breaking innovation.297 In conclusion, 
Domeij argues that some marketing activities of a second generation 
medicine can be an abuse of dominant position.298  
 
In Renckitt Benckiser299, a case decided in the United Kingdom, a 
pharmaceutical company admitted infringement of Article 102 for 
                                                
291 See revised Article 10 (1) of Directive 2001/83/EC.  
292 Domeij (2013) p. 136.  
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withdrawing and delisting the hearth-burn medicine Gaviscon Original 
Liquid when launching the upgraded version Gaviscon Advance Liquid. 
The patent on Gaviscon Original had expired before any generic version 
was launched on the market. Also, the second generation product Gaviscon 
Advance Liquid, had already been introduced to the market. The OFT 
discussed the relevance of intent. With reference to the GC’s decision in 
AstraZeneca, it was found that while intent does not constitute a necessary 
condition for Article 102 to be applicable, it could be useful to confirm the 
abusive nature of the conduct.300   
                                                
300 Ibid, paras 3.45-3.48.  
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6 Analysis and Concluding Remarks 
6.1 A comment on the descriptive parts  
The present study was designed to analyse the legality of evergreening of 
pharmaceutical patents from a competition law perspective. By reviewing 
the components necessary to make this analysis, namely the pharmaceutical 
sector, patent law and competition law, it is the author’s anticipation that the 
reader has gained an understanding of the competing policy objectives that 
needs to be taken into account when discussing whether a certain conduct 
constitutes an abuse or not. The result of this study indicates that up to 
today, one cannot fully determine when evergreening is legal and when it is 
an abuse of a dominant position. The complexity of such an assessment, in 
combination with the absence of case law, leads to the conclusion that the 
legal position is unclear. Nonetheless, some comments and suggestions can 
be made which may be useful when making an attempt to draw the line 
between lawful use and unlawful abuse. Before moving to this part of the 
thesis, a few general comments shall be made concerning the findings in the 
descriptive chapters.  
 
The second chapter dealt with the pharmaceutical industry. Noteworthy is 
the changing nature of the sector. This was one of the reasons for the 
Pharma Report in 2009, which suggested that innovation of new 
pharmaceuticals is on the decline. It is evident that less bestsellers like 
Losec or Viagra are launched on the market but it is not obvious that 
innovation has gone down throughout the entire sector. As apparent from 
this study, biotechnology companies are on the rise. It may be the case that 
innovation has just moved down a step from the large originators to the 
small biotechnology companies. Furthermore, incremental innovation seems 
to be more common. Thus, innovation may still be happening but in other 
ways than before.  
 
The second chapter also highlighted the need for patent protection in the 
pharmaceutical sector. One of the sector’s defining features is the presence 
of patents which has to be balanced off against the need to protect the 
competitive process on the market. These two disciplines are not in conflict. 
On the opposite, they work in tandem to achieve the same object of 
promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources. What 
they do is that they seek to meet this object in contrasting ways. Therefore, 
the aim should be to protect competition from being distorted without 
strangling the incentives to innovate. In a way, competition law 
circumscribes intellectual property law and intervenes only when an 
exclusive right is used to an extent that the law did not intend. Even though 
it has been concluded that they have share the same aim, the means to that 
aim are sometimes conflicting which inevitably leads to tensions.  
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In chapter three, some interesting aspects of the patent law system were 
discussed. Patents are crucial for the pharmaceutical sector. The most 
common argument in support of strong patent protection is the need to 
create incentives to innovate by rewarding the innovator with a patent. The 
most interesting finding was that patent law itself, usually praised for its 
ability to stimulate innovation, can be counterproductive and actually 
impede innovation. Hence, the challenge is to find a balance between over- 
and under-protection which may be a difficult task for the legislator.  
 
Chapter four dealt with abuse of dominant position. By studying case law on 
exclusionary abuse, it can be concluded that an undertaking, seen as 
dominant under Article 102, have a special responsibility to act in a way 
that does not impair genuine undistorted competition. An abuse within the 
meaning of Article 102 is established if the conduct departs from normal 
competition. Normal competition comprises of competition on the merits 
and, as follows, behaviour outside the scope of competition on the merits is 
unlawful. Therefore, the important thing to consider is at what point, if at 
all, a particular behaviour falls outside the scope of competition on the 
merits. An interesting finding is the EU Courts tendency to define the 
relevant market narrowly for pharmaceutical products. In the future, this 
may have the consequence of many originators being dominant which will 
activate their special responsibility under Article 102.  
 
When tying chapter two, three and four together it seems like the challenge 
is to balance the policy objectives behind three legal areas: pharmaceutical 
regulatory law, the patent system and competition law, against each other. 
The ultimate level is reached when there is incentives to innovate without 
competition being distorted which eventually leads to greater access to 
effective and affordable medicine.  
6.2 What concerns does evergreening give rise to 
under Article 102?  
The first research question concerned the legality of evergreening in relation 
to Article 102. By studying case law, it can be concluded that evergreening 
can be an abuse of dominant position under Article 102, and thus an 
unlawful practice, even though evergreening practices most definitely 
balance at the border between lawful conduct and unlawful abuse. There is 
no single universal formulation to decide when evergreening becomes 
unlawful, instead the specific circumstances in each individual case will 
decide where to draw the line. When making this assessment, some factors 
needs to be taken into account such as the intention of the strategy and if the 
conduct has a potential or an actual effect on the market. In addition, the 
Pharma Report provides a useful starting point even if the report does not 
give any legal certainty or provide any clear guidance on how far a patent 
holder can go.  
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A small case study of AstraZeneca was provided. The judgment in the GC 
has met some criticism for setting the bar too low for when a misleading 
statement to a patent office can be seen as an abuse, while the CJEU’s 
judgment has not yet been commented in academia. The author makes the 
conclusion that the CJEU was somewhat more cautious when ruling on how 
far the special responsibility of a dominant company extends and opens up 
for a more flexible application of Article 102. However, more case law is 
needed in order for a more certain and accurate statement of the legality of 
evergreening.   
 
In this essay, three sorts of evergreening practices were presented, namely 
patent litigation, patent clusters and second generation products. The study 
was successful as it was able to identify these practices and their anti-
competitive effects. First, patent litigation was presented. In this section, it 
was concluded that while the right to bring litigation is fundamental, there 
are situations in which litigation is anti-competitive and within the scope of 
Article 102. In order for the action to be abusive, two cumulative criteria 
need to be fulfilled. First, it is necessary that the action cannot reasonably be 
considered as an attempt to establish the rights of the undertaking concerned 
and therefore only serves to harass the opposite party. Second, the action 
must be a part of a plan whose goal is to eliminate competition. The decisive 
component that distinguishes anti-competitive litigation from legitimate 
litigation seems to be intent. In the case referred to in chapter five, ITT 
Promedia, adequate proof of an anti-competitive intent could be found.  
 
Also, patent clusters were discussed. From the review in chapter five, it may 
be assumed that multiple patents, or even just a multitude of pending patent 
applications, may discourage generic companies from entering the market. 
Batchelor’s critical view on this was presented. He argues that regulating 
patent portfolios through competition law is “fraught with dangers” and not 
a task for the Commission. To some extent, this is a valid argument: patent 
offices are the competent authority to deal with patents. But competition law 
works as a check on the patent system and intervenes when a patent is 
abused, why the validity of this argument may be questioned.        
 
Last, second generation products were discussed. It can be concluded that 
incremental innovation as such is fully legitimate and part of the normal 
competitive process. Furthermore, the launch of a second generation product 
is lawful and cannot be questioned from a competition law perspective. 
However, it seems like the measures taken around such a launch can be 
abusive. One such measure is the promotion and marketing efforts taken by 
originators around the launch of a second generation product. In chapter 
two, it was demonstrated that marketing expenditure exceeds expenditure on 
R&D in the pharmaceutical sector. Hence, a large amount of money is spent 
on the promotion of pharmaceutical products. Usually these measures are 
directed directly against doctors with the purpose to facilitate a switch of the 
doctor’s prescription behaviour from the original product to the second 
generation product. This kind of marketing can be focused on the benefits of 
the second generation product but also focus on negative marketing of the 
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original product, both with the aim to prevent generic substitution. In the 
thesis, this was demonstrated by the fact that the switch often took place in 
the year before loss of exclusivity of the original product. This shows how 
the originator company intentionally uses marketing activities to delay or 
prevent generic entry, which is an indicator of an anti-competitive intent.  
 
Up to today, there is no precedent which condemns marketing of second 
generation products as forbidden under Article 102, even though it may be 
concluded that the launch of a second generation product in combination 
with extensive marketing and promotion efforts raise concerns about its 
anti-competitive effects. However, it must be questioned whether Article 
102 reasonably extends to marketing activities. Any company who wants to 
make money will do their utmost to make their product known and 
marketing and promotion efforts could conceivably be within the scope of 
competition on the merits. But can medicine be compared to any other 
product? One could argue that the price-disconnect on the pharmaceutical 
market calls upon a more stringent assessment of marketing and promotion 
activities when launching a second generation product on the market. If an 
anti-competitive intent to delay or prevent generic entry can be established, 
in combination with an actual or a potential effect on the market, it is the 
author’s opinion that it may constitute an abuse under Article 102. The 
pharmaceutical market cannot, and should not, be compared to markets for 
other products, for example cars.   
6.3 How far can a patent holder go? 
The second research question raised the question how far a patent holder can 
go before he or she infringes competition law. This issue is complex and 
initially it should be noted that each and every case has its own 
characteristics to be considered, making it impossible to give a general 
formulation as to when a patentee has gone too far. Therefore, only a few 
general assumptions can be made. 
 
The result of this study indicates that the standard for abuse is conduct 
outside the scope of competition on the merits. But if the alleged 
undertaking brings arguments and evidence of an objective justification, for 
example a legitimate business rationale, its behaviour will not be seen as 
abusive. It is clear from AstraZeneca that the burden from 
pharmacovigilance obligations was not enough for the company’s conduct 
to be lawful. But it may be the case that AstraZeneca failed to show any 
pro-competitive justifications. In the future, the concept of objective 
justification may be a safe haven for dominant pharmaceutical companies. 
For example, the Commission’s dedication to a more effects-based approach 
to competition law enforcement is an indicator of such a scenario. 
Furthermore, even though not laid down in law, the Courts have opened up 
a possibility for undertakings in a dominant position, found guilty of 
abusing their position, to bring forth arguments and evidence that justifies 
their conduct. Possible justifications are probably economic arguments, for 
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example the need to recoup investments in R&D but also more general 
justifications such as the need to protect the company’s patent portfolio.   
 
AstraZeneca confirmed that the replacing of a product with a second 
generation product is not capable of being abusive in itself, though in 
combination with additional strategies, for example the withdrawal of a 
marketing authorisation, it may constitute an abuse. In this thesis, such 
additional strategies have been referred to as switching strategies. This 
could be illustrated as a “product switching plus.” The switch becomes 
abusive when another element is added which has the intention to hinder 
competition. This may well be the difference between use and abuse when 
launching a second generation product. Even though Article 102 does not 
demand any subjective criteria to be applicable, intention matters when 
making the assessment of whether a certain conduct is a use or an abuse.  
 
Does Article 102 provide for an adequate medicine to remedy anti-
competitive conduct in the pharmaceutical sector? It may be questioned 
whether the EU authorities have gone too far in their enforcement of the 
competition rules. Competition law can provide for an adequate remedy in 
cases evergreening when the abuse is clearly anti-competitive and criteria of 
Article 102 are fulfilled. However, it is evident that competition law neither 
can nor should step in to correct imperfections in the patent system. 
Pharmaceutical patents are complex and their legality should not be 
reviewed by the CJEU.  
6.4 Concluding remarks 
As a concluding remark, I would like to give my view on why 
pharmaceutical companies engage in evergreening and suggest a way 
forward. The patent system gives a reward for those who innovate by 
granting a patent. A patent brings along many benefits, especially the 
exclusive right to exploit the patent, thereby bringing in high profits. In the 
case study of AstraZeneca, it has been showed that a pharmaceutical 
product may have annual sales reaching around 6€ billion if successful. But 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry has declined, with several 
successful medicines going off patent without being replaced by new 
bestsellers. The reason for the situation is not obvious and the explanations 
are probably many. One potential explanation is that medicine for a lot of 
diseases already has already been invented. The counterargument is 
obvious: the world is still waiting for a cure against HIV/AIDS and there are 
countless other diseases, especially in the developing world, that need 
medicines. Another potential explanation can be the favourable rules that 
exist for generic companies, making it unprofitable to be a research-based 
originator company. This may have encouraged originators to make the 
most out of the patents they already possess by using different patent 
strategies i.e. evergreening.  
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The launch of a second generation product may be one such strategy. By 
investing money into incremental innovation, with the possibility to receive 
patent protection for another 20 years, an incentive to make smaller 
improvements to existing products exists. As concluded above, it is not the 
incremental innovation itself that is unlawful. Neither is it the filing of an 
application to the patent office that is unlawful, as long as the application is 
not characterised by highly misleading representations and a manifest lack 
of transparency, as confirmed by AstraZeneca. Rather, it is the measures 
taken around the launch of the second generation product that is suspicious 
from a competition law perspective.  
 
Under what circumstances such measures are unlawful under Article 102 
has already been discussed. But even if they are lawful from a competition 
law perspective, it may not be in the interest of society at large. Instead of 
investing money on new, revolutionary medicine which could save lives, 
money is invested in incremental innovation which only finds smaller 
improvements. The author is not denying that such innovation is beneficial. 
As outlined in this thesis, such innovation may lead to significant 
improvements of the original product e.g. new therapeutic indications may 
be discovered, improvements may be done within the same therapeutic 
indication and the number of medicines within that therapeutic class may 
expand. But how do we really need pharmaceuticals against everything? 
And from a more ethical perspective, would it not be better if we found a 
medicine that could cure millions of people in Africa, instead of a new 
version of an existing medicine that can be dissolved in water instead of 
swallowed as a tablet? To be really cynical, some of this research is actually 
useless and for the wealth of the society it would be better if this innovation 
were put into real and important research.  
 
Therefore, the author suggests that a reform of the patent system may be a 
way forward. In this thesis, it has been shown that by raising the bar for 
patentability, a smaller amount of patents covering minor improvements 
will be granted. This will reduce the incentives to invest money on 
incremental innovation focused on minor improvements. Instead, by 
creating a favourable environment for innovation of medicine for neglected 
medicine, money will be invested into R&D that society needs. Incremental 
innovation will still occur: small improvements, for example by introducing 
a medicine that used to be in tablet form as one dispersible in water, will 
make the product more competitive and win new market shares without a 
new patent.  
 
The establishment of a “unitary patent” may have an effect on evergreening. 
On the one hand, it may encourage some of the unlawful evergreening 
strategies, but on the other, it may also prevent some of them. First, it is 
most probable that a unitary patent will make it easier to obtain patent 
protection for a product. Even though there are ways to obtain a “European 
patent“ today, this will turn into a bundle of national patents once granted.  
A simplified patent process where one unitary patent is granted is beneficial 
for originators, which may affect the generic industry in a pejorative way. 
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But a unitary patent may also prevent some of the anti-competitive effects 
of evergreening. In addition to the unitary patent, a unitary patent Court is 
going to be established. A unitary court could potentially deal with some of 
the anti-competitive litigation. Furthermore, a judgment in favour of a 
generic manufacturer is valid for the entire EU, making separate patent 
processes in each Member State unnecessary. This could reduce litigation 
costs and potentially provide for a more rapid access to justice.  
 
Another way forward could be the launch of new guidance paper from the 
Commission, similar to the Guidance on Abusive Exclusionary Conduct, but 
including the new forms of abuse and inter alia evergreening. Even though, 
as with the present guidelines, this would not constitute a statement of the 
law, such guidance would provide direction for pharmaceutical companies 
when using their patent rights.   
 
Patents will be used to their utmost extent, as they have always been, and 
therefore the law must declare clear rules on when lawful use becomes an 
unlawful abuse. At this point, Article 102 does not do that. Clearer rules, 
more case law and and a little common sense is called upon. 
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